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The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting
Dorothy Shapiro Lund †

Abstract
American investors have begun to embrace the reality that academics have
been championing for decades—that a broad-based passive indexing strategy is
superior to picking individual stocks or investing in actively managed funds. But
there are several reasons to believe that the rise of passive investing will have harmful
consequences for firm governance, shareholders, and the economy. First, because
passive funds seek only to match the performance of an index—not outperform it—
they lack a financial incentive to ensure that each of the companies in their very large
portfolios are well-run. Second, passive funds face an acute collective action
problem: any investment in improving the performance of a company will benefit all
funds that track the index equally, while only the activist fund incurs the costs. Third,
passive funds do not generate firm-specific information as a byproduct of investing
and thus must expend additional resources to identify underperforming firms and
evaluate interventions proposed by other investors. Such expenditures would undo
the cost savings that attracted investors to the passive fund in the first place.
For these reasons, many passive funds are likely to leave company
performance to the invisible hand of the marketplace. And even if a fund does
choose to intervene, it will rationally adhere to a low-cost, one-size-fits-all approach
to governance that is unlikely to be in the company’s best interest. The scope of this
problem is potentially immense: as investors continue to flock toward passive
investment vehicles, the institutional investors that dominate the passive fund market
will increasingly influence and even control the outcome of shareholder
interventions—from shareholder votes to those proposed by hedge fund activists—
creating widespread economic harm. For that reason, this paper proposes that
lawmakers consider restricting passive funds from voting at shareholder meetings.
Doing so would reduce the influence of passive funds in governance and also
preserve the role of informed investors as a force for managerial discipline.

Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago. The author is
grateful for comments from Will Baude, Douglas Baird, Omri Ben-Shahar, William Birdthistle, Tony
Casey, Adam Chilton, Stephen Choi, Scott Davis, Gillian Hadfield, Todd Henderson, Aziz Huq,
Ronald Gilson, Daniel Hemel, Genevieve Lakier, Alex Lee, Saul Levmore, John Morley, Eric Posner,
Ed Rock, Mark Roe, Leo Strine, Jr., Guhan Subramanian, and the University of Chicago Bigelow
Fellows, as well as enlightening conversations with executives, hedge fund analysts, and mutual fund
advisors who wish to remain anonymous. Email: dorothyshapiro@uchicago.edu.
†

The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1
II. AGENCY COSTS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE
INFLUENCE ................................................................................................................................... 5
III. THE THREAT OF PASSIVE INVESTING .................................................................................. 13
A. The Rise of Passive Investing ............................................................................................. 13
B. Passive Investing and Corporate Governance ................................................................. 18
i. Passivity, Voting, and Engagement ............................................................................... 23
ii. Passivity and Hedge Fund Activism .............................................................................. 28
IV. POLICY PROPOSALS .................................................................................................................. 31
A. Rethinking Passive Fund Voting ........................................................................................ 34
i. Eliminate Passive Fund Voting ...................................................................................... 37
ii. Institute Pass-Through Voting for Passive Funds ...................................................... 38
iii. Institute Pass-Through Voting as a Default................................................................. 40
B. The Difficulty of Incentivizing Beneficial Investment in Governance ........................ 43
V. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................. 45

The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting

I. INTRODUCTION
The one-share, one-vote system is at the core of American shareholder
democracy. It has been the default under state law for over a century, supported by
economic theory indicating that linking voting rights and residual ownership is the
most efficient way to run a corporation. The recent rise of passive investing,
however, casts doubt on the continued validity of this received wisdom.
In the past few years, millions of investors have abandoned actively managed
mutual funds, or “active funds,” in favor of passively managed funds, or “passive
funds.” This past year alone, investors withdrew $340 billion from active funds
(approximately 4 percent of the total) while investing $533 billion into passive funds
(growing the total by 9 percent).1 And this historically unprecedented shift in
investor behavior has generated a flurry of news coverage, with articles proclaiming
that index funds “are eating the world.” 2
The rise of passive investing is good news for investors, who benefit from
greater diversification and lower costs. But the implications for corporate governance
are less positive. Unlike active funds, which pick stocks based on their performance,
passive funds—a term that includes index funds and exchange traded funds
(“ETFs”)—are designed to automatically track a market index. For this reason, this
paper contends that the growth of passive funds has the potential to distort and
dampen the market for corporate influence. 3
Participants in the market for corporate influence—generally institutional
investors and activist hedge funds 4—use the influence that accompanies their large
ownership positions to discipline management. And although these investors lack
perfect incentives to engage in corporate stewardship, 5 their presence provides a
See MORNINGSTAR DIRECT ASSET FLOWS COMMENTARY: UNITED STATES (Jan. 11, 2016),
https://corporate.morningstar.com/us/documents/assetflows/assetflowsjan2017.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Sarah Krouse, David Benoit, and Tom McGinty, The New Corporate Power Brokers, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 24, 2016); Tom McGinty, Sarah Krouse, and Elliot Bentley, Index Funds are Taking Over the S&P
500, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016); Jason Zweig, Are Index Funds Eating the World?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26,
2016); John Authers and Chris Newlands, Exchange Traded Funds: Taking Over the Markets, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 6. 2016); Nicole Bullock and Dan McCrum, Rapid Rise of ETFs Sparks Growing Pains, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2016).
3 The origin of the phrase “the market for corporate influence” is Brian R. Cheffins and John
Armour, The Past Present and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. OF CORP. L. 51(2011).
4 Although hedge funds are institutional investors, this paper separates activist hedge funds into their
own category because of their ex ante investing strategy. See note 14, infra.
5 Much has been written about the hedge fund activist’s short-term perspective, as well as the
collective action problems facing mutual funds. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary
Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
449, 458–59 (2014) (contending that empowering investors with short-term investment horizons will
compromise long-term value); Iman Anabtawi and Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1290–92 (2008) (arguing that activist investors’ push for short-term benefits
may harm long-term shareholders); Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 887 (2013)
(discussing the collective action problem facing institutional investors); Edward B. Rock, Institutional
Investors in Corporate Governance (University of Pennsylvania Working Paper, July 21, 2015) (manuscript
1
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check against managerial slack, primarily because they identify underperforming
firms as part of their investing strategy and are incentivized to discipline wayward
management.
Passive funds are different. Because they seek only to match the performance of
a market index, passive funds lack a financial incentive to ensure that each of the
companies in their portfolios are well-run. For one, passive funds tend to have very
large portfolios, and therefore, an investment in improving governance at a single
firm is especially unlikely to enhance the fund’s overall performance. Second, passive
funds face an acute collective action problem because investments in governance
interventions equally benefit all funds tracking the index, while only the activist fund
bears the costs. Third, governance interventions are especially costly for a passive
fund—unlike active funds, passive funds do not generate information about firm
performance as a byproduct of trading. Therefore, thoughtful governance
interventions require the passive fund to expend additional resources gathering firmspecific information as well as develop governance expertise. Such expenditures
would undo the cost savings that attracted investors to the passive fund in the first
place.
Accordingly, as assets continue to flow into passive funds, agency costs will
increase because managers of passive funds will be less likely to engage thoughtfully
with portfolio companies and discipline management. Passive fund managers will
also be likely to adhere to low-cost voting strategies, such as following a proxy
advisor’s recommendation or voting “yes” to any shareholder proposal that meets
pre-defined qualifications. And without a consensus about what constitutes good
governance, there is reason to believe that the proliferation of an unthinking, onesize-fits-all approach to governance will make many companies worse off.
In addition, the rise of passive investing has the potential to distort hedge fund
activism. Hedge fund activists are increasingly moderated by large institutional
investors with the power to block campaigns that are not in the interest of their longterm shareholders and catalyze interventions that are deemed beneficial. But passive
funds are less likely to serve as a “keel” to activism, which means not only that
certain beneficial interventions will not occur, but also that certain detrimental
interventions may nonetheless garner substantial support.
For now, the majority of mutual fund assets are invested in active funds, which
lessens concerns about governance distortions. 6 But the rapid growth of passive
investing is predicted to continue, and already some S&P 500 companies have
passive fund ownership in excess of 20 percent. Moreover, the institutional investors
that dominate the passive fund market—Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street
Global Advisers—already have a substantial voice in corporate governance.
Together, the “Big Three” are the largest shareholder of 88 percent of major U.S.
at 13) (explaining that institutional investors suffer from a misalignment of incentives that causes
them to be relatively passive when it comes to corporate governance).
6 McGinty et al., Index Funds are Taking Over the S&P 500, supra note 2.
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companies. 7 In other words, the institutional investors that favor a passive investing
strategy are beginning to crowd out the active investors.
So long as institutional investors house passive funds and active funds under the
same roof, the passive funds may be able to free ride off of information generated by
active funds when there is investment overlap. But active funds invest in a smaller
number of companies than passive funds and so overlap is not guaranteed. And as
assets continue to flow out of active funds, there will be even fewer common
investments, as well as less information generated by active fund managers.
There is another reason to suspect that passive fund ownership will soon
approach a problematic level: the optimal amount of active participation in
governance is likely to be greater than the amount that is necessary to keep stock
market pricing efficient. If a few active funds police the market for underperforming
stocks and use that information to inform trading decisions, stock prices will rise and
fall with company value. 8 But a small percentage of informed investors cannot
control governance outcomes. If passive funds own only 51 percent of a company’s
stock, they will be able to unilaterally determine the success of shareholder proposals,
proxy contests, and hedge fund activism, even in the face of total opposition from
informed investors. And even with less than absolute voting control, passive funds
could still substantially affect corporate behavior. 9 This means that governance
distortions will appear long before stock price inefficiencies do.
The legal literature has thus far focused on a different problem associated with
the rise of passive investing, and institutional investing more broadly—the potential
for anticompetitive behavior that arises when institutional investors own large stakes
in rival firms in oligopolistic industries. 10 The theory is that managers of highly
diversified institutional investors may pressure portfolio company management to
refrain from aggressive price competition that would harm their other investments. 11
This paper provides an alternative explanation: rather than inducing companies
to collude, passive fund managers are not doing enough to push management to
maximize shareholder welfare. Moreover, when passive funds do intervene in
governance, there is little reason to believe that their influence will benefit companies
and investors. And the scope of the problem is potentially much larger than the
See Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton, and E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive
Power of Institutional Investors, ANTITRUST L. J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7).
8 See generally Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: a Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970).
9 See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 5, at 1270-71 (discussing how minority shareholders can influence
corporate decisionmaking even when they have small stakes in the company).
10 See Posner et al., supra note 7; Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 12911292 (2016); Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Mutual Funds’ Dark Side, SLATE (Apr. 16, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/04/mutual_funds_mak
e_air_travel_ more_expensive_institutional_investors_reduce.html. But see Edward B. Rock and
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional Investor Involvement in Corporate Governance
(March 1, 2017), NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-07.
11 See Posner et al., supra note 7.
7
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threat of anticompetitive conduct because it extends beyond companies in
oligopolistic industries, and concerns all companies with a high concentration of
passive ownership, which is a large and growing segment of the U.S. market.
In linking passive investing and governance distortion, this paper makes four
novel contributions. First, it redeems the oft-criticized institutional investor as an
important participant in the market for corporate influence. It shows that there is a
difference between institutional investors that favor an active management strategy
and those who take a passive approach to investing and supports this observation
with a description of mutual fund activism. Second, it solves a puzzle that has
perplexed some corporate law scholars—why passive funds have failed to act as
seriously engaged owners in spite of the fact that their buy-and-hold investment
strategy gives them an interest in the long-term health of portfolio companies. In so
doing, the paper develops a theory describing the acute incentive problems that
prevent passive funds from participating thoughtfully in governance. Third, the
paper shows how the rise of passive investing may exacerbate agency cost problems
at corporations, with the potential to create billions of dollars in social welfare losses.
Finally, the paper offers a novel policy proposal for lawmakers: that the law
could restrict truly passive funds from voting at shareholder meetings. By
diminishing the role of passive investors in governance, this rule would not only
reduce the risk of distortion, but also preserve the voice of informed investors as a
force for discipline. And there is a compelling legal rationale for such a restriction.
Passive funds lack governance expertise and firm-specific knowledge, and so a
thoughtful voting strategy would increase costs without meaningfully improving
portfolio returns. Thoughtless voting is also likely to harm investors, as well as other
shareholders, especially as passive funds grow in size and influence. In other words,
pursuit of either approach would put the passive fund at risk of breaching its
fiduciary duty to act in its investors’ best interests. A law restricting passive funds
from voting, therefore, would make both investors and fund managers better off.
This paper proceeds as follows: Part II maps the rise of institutional investor
ownership and the role that it has played in controlling agency cost problems created
by the separation of ownership and control. Part III details the dramatic and
historically unprecedented rise of passive investing. It then describes the incentive
problems facing passive funds and shows how the structure of institutional investors
that favor a passive investment strategy reflect those incentives. It contends that the
rise of passive investing will increase agency costs and distort corporate governance,
both by decreasing the frequency and efficacy of governance interventions by
informed investors and increasing the likelihood that ineffective or detrimental
interventions will succeed. It discusses evidence showing that passive investing is
already beginning to affect firm governance at companies with a large concentration
of passive fund ownership and contends that these distortions will grow more severe
in the future. Part IV proposes several policy reforms that would restrict or limit the
voting power of passive funds. It also explains why reforms aimed at incentivizing
4
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actively managed funds to take an active role in governance would be less effective
than restricting passive funds from voting. Part V concludes.
II.

AGENCY COSTS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, AND THE MARKET FOR
CORPORATE INFLUENCE

Controlling agency costs has been a focus in corporate legal scholarship since at
least the 1930s, when Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means first highlighted the agency
problem created by the separation of ownership and control. 12 Berle and Means
posited that collective action problems would prevent dispersed shareholders from
optimally monitoring management. Knowing this, entrenched management would
do just enough to satisfy shareholders and retain the residual benefits of management
for themselves. 13
However, we no longer live in a Berle and Means world of dispersed
shareholdings—the investor base is now consolidated in the hands of large
institutional investors. 14 From 1980 to 1996, large institutional investors nearly
doubled their share of ownership of U.S. corporations from under 30% to over
50%. 15 By 2010, institutional investors held approximately 80% of the U.S. stock

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
13 Id. at 82-83.
14 The term “institutional investor” encompasses institutions with very different structures and
incentives. First, there are for-profit asset managers, some of which are publically held, such as
BlackRock. Rock, supra note 5, at 6. Second, there are “mutual” and nonprofit management
companies, including Vanguard, whose management company is owned by Vanguard funds and is
thus indirectly owned by Vanguard investors. Id. at 7. Third, there are public-employee pension funds,
such as CalPERS, whose boards are appointed by politicians or directly elected by voters.
Unsurprisingly, these funds are generally responsive to political pressure. Fourth, there are unionrelated funds, including the AFL-CIO, which typically pursue a labor agenda. Id. This paper focuses
on the first and second types of investors, which have been the primary drivers of the growth in
institutional investing.
Hedge funds are also institutional investors. Hedge funds are privately organized investment
vehicles that are not widely available to the public and thus mostly operate outside of securities
regulation. The typical hedge fund manager has strong incentives to generate positive returns because
his or her pay depends primarily on performance. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, and
Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. OF FIN. 1729,
1735 (2008). Hedge funds can be “activists,” identifying problematic companies ex ante and then
making strategic interventions, or they can take an ex post approach to governance like mutual funds
and pension funds. Because of their ex ante investment strategy, this paper excludes activist hedge
funds from the institutional investor category.
15 Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 QUARTERLY J.
ECON. 229 (2001).
12
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market. 16 Mutual funds have been the largest drivers of this growth: in 1980, they
owned $70 billion in assets, and in 2009, that number was up to $7.2 trillion. 17
Initially, the increasing concentration of the shareholder base was lauded as the
solution to the agency cost problems created by the separation of ownership and
control. 18 In theory, an investor with a large ownership stake in a company should
have strong incentives to monitor and discipline management because less of the
benefit of monitoring will be shared. In addition, because of their large ownership
positions, institutional investors should be less likely to use “exit” as a disciplinary
tool because selling shares en masse would depress the stock price and cause the firm
to incur greater losses. For that reason, the scholarly consensus was that large
institutional investors would increasingly use “voice” to discipline management. 19
But institutional investors failed to live up to these high expectations. 20 In the
first place, proxy voting data seems to confirm that institutional investors take a
passive approach to governance. During the 2007 to 2009 proxy seasons, for
example, mutual funds proposed only 4.5% of all shareholder proposals, and only
0.9% addressed corporate governance or performance issues. 21 In addition, a recent
study indicates that institutional investors rarely support other shareholder proposals
Posner et al., supra note 7, at 7; see also Marshall E. Blume and Donald B. Keim, Working
Paper, Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships, The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania (Aug. 21, 2012). Although there has been a sharp increase in retail
ownership of equities in the past forty years—approximately 50% of United States households own
stock, which is up 30% from 1977—equity mutual funds have been the source of this growth, and not
the ownership of individual stocks. Id. at 884.
17 Rock, supra note 5 at 5. Changes in federal retirement policy were responsible for the growth of
institutional investing. See generally Gilson and Gordon, supra note 5, at 879; Rock, supra note 5, at 5. In
1974, after it came to light that a large number of pension plans were underfunded, Congress enacted
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which requires retirement plans to support
any promised pension with segregated pools of assets. See I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A), (b)(1) (2006) (setting
forth minimum vesting requirements for defined benefit plans); Employee Retirement Income and
Security Act of 1974 § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006) (same); id. §§ 301–308 (providing for minimum
funding standards). To comply, companies diverted assets into pensions and retirement accounts that
were then invested into the capital markets. Gilson and Gordon, supra note 5 at 879-80.
Modern portfolio theory also played a role in the growth of institutional investing by increasing
investor demand for highly diversified investment vehicles. According to Markowitz’s theory of the
efficiency of mean-variance investing (the precursor to modern portfolio theory), diversification
improves risk-adjusted returns, and the larger the portfolio, the greater the diversification. Moreover,
because secondary markets in mature equities are highly efficient, research that adds value is expensive
and its fixed cost is best spread across large portfolios. These insights were a boon to the mutual
funds and index funds offered by institutional investors. See id.
18 See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 795, 795-85 (1993); Bernard Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,
39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1991); Ronald Gilson and Renier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: an
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 575-91 (1990).
19 See id.; John Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: the Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91
COLUMBIA L. REV. 91, 1277-13 (1977) (discussing the tradeoff between liquidity and voice).
20 See Rock, supra note 5; William W. Bratton and J.A. McCahery, Introduction to Institutional Investor
Activism: Hedge Funds and Private Equity, Economics and Regulation (2015); Gilson and Gordon, supra note
5; Strine, Can We Do Better?, supra note 5, at 481.
21 Gilson and Gordon, supra note 5, at 887.
16
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and are very likely to support management proposals, voting against management
only about ten percent of the time. 22 The fact that hedge fund activism has
skyrocketed in the past ten years also indicates that institutional investor stewardship
has been less than perfect. If institutional investors were optimally monitoring
management, successful activist interventions that generate sustained increases in
firm value would not be so common. 23
Two explanations for institutional investors’ passive approach to governance
have been offered. First and most importantly, the structure of the mutual fund
industry creates a new collective action problem: a fund that invests in governance
will bear the costs, but share the benefits with competitor funds. 24 And because
mutual funds compete against each other on the basis of relative performance—i.e.,
how the fund performed relative to its industry peers—those funds that invest in
governance and stewardship will find themselves less desirable than their rival funds.
Second, certain interventions require the fund to navigate a complex regulatory web,
further increasing costs of governance interventions. 25
22 See Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk, and Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big Three?
Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk (CORPNET,
University of Amsterdam Working Paper, October 28, 2016) (manuscript at 21), available at:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2798653. Much has been written about the problems with institutional
investor voting, including the degree to which it merely serves to amplify the voice of third party
proxy advisors. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1
(2007); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be
Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1
(2010); David F. Larcker, Alan McCall, Gaizka Ormazabal, Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy
Advisory Firms, __J. OF FIN.__ (forthcoming), available at: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/facultyresearch/working-papers/outsourcing-shareholder-voting-proxy-advisory-firms.
23 See C.N. V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy, Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The
Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. OF CORP. FIN 296 (2016); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon
Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2013);
Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence From a Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN.
ECON. 610, 625 tbl.8, tbl.4A (2013) (reporting average (median) “raw” shareholder returns of
approximately 39% (33%) over the average nineteen-month campaign period and average (median)
annualized market-adjusted returns of approximately 4% (4%)); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1750 tbl.III (2008) (reporting average
(median) raw target shareholder returns of 42% (18%) over the campaign period and annualized
average (median) market adjusted returns of 21% (4%)); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial
Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 188, 226 (2009) (reporting
average target shareholder market-adjusted returns of approximately 22% over a one-year postinitiation period).
24 See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors,
Working Paper, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2982617; Gilson
and Gordon, supra note 5, at 887; Rock, supra note 5, at 13; Jill Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will it
Happen? Will it Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L. J. 1009 (1994).
25 MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1996); Mark Roe, A Political Theory of American
Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991); Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined; Black, Agents
Watching Agents. Since these articles were written, certain regulatory constraints have been loosened.
Most notably, the SEC reformed the proxy rules in 1992 to allow institutions to communicate with
other institutions without fear of liability for improper solicitation of proxies. See United States, SEC,
Regulation of Communication Among Shareholders, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No.
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But in spite of these incentive problems and transaction costs, this paper argues
that institutional investors play a vital role in reducing agency costs, a role that has
been underappreciated. In the first place, the collective action problem facing active
funds has been overstated. Actively managed funds rarely have equivalent
investments in the same companies as rival funds, and so an active fund can improve
its relative performance by overweighting a stock and then investing in governance.
Although some of the benefits will be shared, the active fund still has a financial
incentive to use voice as a disciplinary mechanism for investments that make up a
large part of its portfolio (or rather, a larger part of its portfolio than that of its
competitors).
By focusing on voting, the literature also has understated the mechanisms of
institutional investor voice, as well as the expense. Active funds generate information
about portfolio company underperformance as a byproduct of investing, and they
can put that information to work in a variety of ways. In addition to voting, fund
managers can utilize three other inexpensive and effective disciplinary tools: they can
(1) voice displeasure in conversations with management, (2) threaten to sell some of
their stock, or (3) tip off or otherwise support activist hedge funds. And there is
evidence that institutional investors use these tools regularly and effectively.
As for the first tool, institutional investors have increasingly forgone activism at
the ballot box in favor of communications with management, or “engagement,”
which is more effective than proxy voting, though much harder for outsiders to
observe and measure. 26 A recent study documents widespread behind‐the‐scenes
intervention by institutional investors. 27 In this study, most institutional investors
indicated that they use the proxy machinery only after informal communications fail,
which would explain some of the dismal proxy voting records. 28 Another study
reveals that fund analysts regularly meet and converse with management during one31,326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 16, 1992). But substantial regulatory hurdles remain. See generally
Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1021 (2007) (describing regulatory barriers to institutional investor activism).
26 See Joseph McCahery, Zacharias Sautner, & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance
FIN.
(forthcoming
2016),
available
at:
Preference
of
Institutional
Investors,
J.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jofi.12393/ful; Matthew J. Mallow and Jasmine Sethi,
Engagement: The Missing Middle Approach in the Bebchuk-Strine Debates, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 386 (2016);
Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders Quietly Stirring, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-shareholding-giant-is-quietlystirring.html. By contrast, shareholder proposals have very low passage rates, see Stuart Gillan and
Laura Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J.
FIN. ECON. 275 (2000); Stuart Gillan and Laura Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United
States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55 (2007), and proxy fights are very expensive, see Gantchev, supra
note 23, at 9.
27 See McCahery et al., supra note 20 (“The 143 respondents to our survey, mostly very large
institutional investors with a long- term focus, indicate that voice, especially when conducted behind
the scenes, is highly important. For example, 63% of the respondents state that, in the past five years,
they have engaged in direct discussions with management, and 45% have had private discussions with
a company’s board outside of management’s presence.”)
28 Id.
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on-one meetings at road shows, conferences, investors’ offices, and firm
headquarters. 29
There is also evidence that informal communications with management are quite
effective. In a study conducted in 1998, researchers evaluated correspondence
between the Teachers Insurance Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities
Fund (“TIAA-CREF”) and the 45 firms that it contacted about governance issues
between 1992 and 1996. 30 The correspondence indicated that TIAA-CREF was
generally able to secure its desired governance change without resorting to a proxy
contest: the fund reached agreements with 98% of the firms that it contacted, despite
obtaining majority support in only one case. Other studies that have evaluated the
success rate of fund interventions report similar results. 31 In addition, this past year,
almost half of the S&P 500 companies that disclosed engagement with investors also
disclosed making changes to their governance and practices as a result of such
engagement. 32
Second, there is evidence that institutional investors can and do use the threat of
exit as a disciplinary tool. 33 One study of institutional investor engagement reports
that funds commonly use the threat of exit in conversations with management and
that such threats are successful in securing desired changes 40% of the time. 34
Third, and finally, institutional investors increasingly collaborate with other
investors to influence management. 35 The most important form of collaboration is
with activist hedge funds. Hedge fund activists buy large stakes in underperforming
companies with the goal of agitating for changes that would improve shareholder
returns. 36 These interventions range from minor policy changes, such as instituting
See David Soloman and Eugene Soltes, What Are We Meeting For? The Consequences of Private Meetings
with Investors 58 J. LAW. & ECON. 325 (2016) (finding that 97% of CEOs of publicly traded firms meet
privately with investors, and a 2010 survey showed that on average CEOs and CFOs had meetings
with investors on 17 and 26 days out of the year respectively).
30 Willard T. Carleton, James M. Nelson, and Michael S. Weisbach, The Influence of Institutions on
Corporate Governance though Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF, 53 J. FIN. 1335 (1998).
31 See Elroy Dimson, Oguzhan Karakas, and Xi Li, Active Ownership, Working
Paper, London Business School (2014); Marco Becht, Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossi,
Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence From a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN.
STUDIES 3093 (2009); Michael Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS,
51 J. FIN. 227 (1996).
32
Four Takeaways from Proxy Season 2015, Ernst & Young (June 2015),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-four-takeaways-from-proxy-season2015/$File/EY-four-takeaways-from-proxy-season-2015.pdf.
33 Although exit becomes more costly as an investor’s stake increases, it is not impossible—market
analytics show that institutional investors routinely decrease their stake in underperforming
companies. See Strine, Can We Do Better?, supra note 5 at 479 n.87.
34 See McCahery et al., supra note 20.
35 Such communication became possible in 1999, when the SEC adopted Rule 14a-12, which allows
investors to communicate with an unlimited number of shareholders. See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-12;
Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J.
CORP. L. 681, 687-88 (2007).
36 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 1021, 1045 (2007).
29
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stock buybacks or dividend payments, to large-scale efforts, such as pressuring the
company to sell itself or replace members of the board of directors. Because of their
concentrated stakes in companies and compensation structure that allows managers
to recoup a substantial fraction of the profits from an intervention, activist hedge
funds have strong incentives to improve the value of their investment. 37
As such, whether the activist hedge fund should be welcomed as a beneficial
force for discipline or spurned as a corporate raider has been debated extensively.
Critics, including the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, contend that
activist hedge funds push for policies skewed to their own short-term interests,
without sufficiently weighing whether those policies create too little long-term
investment or too much leverage and externality risk. 38 This advocacy has led to
increased regulatory scrutiny of activist hedge funds. 39
In spite of skepticism from academics and regulators, the empirical evidence
generally shows a sustained increase in firm value following an activist intervention,
as well as more innovation and improved firm performance. 40 This may be because
See Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst, supra note 24, at 21.
See Strine, Can We Do Better?, supra note 5, at 458–59 (contending that empowering investors with
short-term investment horizons will compromise long-term value); Strine, One Fundamental Corporate
Governance Question, supra note 22 (explaining the difficulty of ensuring that corporations are managed
to promote long-term growth when most shareholders hold shares for only a short time); Anabtawi
and Stout, supra note 5, at 1290–92 (2008) (arguing that activist investors’ push for short-term benefits
may harm long-term shareholders); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power,
53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 579 (2006) (explaining that active funds alter their investment positions with
high frequency and seek to profit from short-term fluctuations in price without regard to a company’s
long-term profits); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751 (2006) (noting that activist investors are the stockholders most likely to
take advantage of increased stockholder power and most likely to misuse that power for their own
purposes); William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 654, 726–27 (contending that “managing to the market is the problem that needs to be
addressed” and linking the 2008 financial crisis to shareholder pressures to focus on short-term price
increases); Martin J. Lipton, Twenty-Five Years After Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom: Old Battles,
New Attacks and the Continuing War, 60 BUS. LAWYER 1369, 1377 (2005) (contending that activist
shareholders do not consider long-term interests of corporation or shareholders as a whole).
39 The SEC has focused recent insider trading suits on hedge funds. See Todd Henderson and Kevin
Haeberle, Information-Dissemination Law: The Regulation of How Market-Moving Information Is Revealed, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1373 (2016). In addition, the SEC’s somewhat recent adoption of Regulation FD is
widely viewed by corporate officers and directors as an obstacle to more robust communication
between management and shareholders. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Constraints on Shareholder Activism in the United States and Slovenia (May 15, 2000), available at:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=228780 (contending that Regulation FD will chill communications
between management and large shareholders). Recently, the SEC has received requests to shorten the
Schedule 13D disclosure window and broaden the definition of beneficial share ownership to cover
purely economic positions generated by derivative trades. These proposals, if enacted, would
substantially reduce the returns to activist shareholders by reducing the economic stake that an activist
shareholder can accumulate before news of its presence drives up the price of the target company’s
stock. See Gilson and Gordon, supra note 5, at 904; Lucian A. Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The
Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2012).
40 See C.N. V. Krishnan et al., supra note 23; Bebchuk, et al., Long-Term Effects, supra note 23; Nickolay
Gantchev, Oleg Gredil and Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Governance Under the Gun: Spillover Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism, Working Paper (Jan. 2015); Gantchev, supra note 23, at 625 tbl.8, tbl.4A; Alon Brav,
37
38
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the activists who are willing to bear the high costs associated with an activist
campaign are those that will reap substantial gains from activism, perhaps because a
company is very badly managed. And it may also be because of the involvement of
institutional investors, which have become a “keel” for hedge fund activism. 41
At the outset, an activist investor knows that it will be critical to secure the
support of institutional investors if the campaign is to succeed. When an activist
launches a campaign, it rarely purchases enough stock to control voting outcomes—
for campaigns launched in 2015, the median percentage ownership of the activist
investor or group of investors was less than 7%, and less than 3% at companies with
a market capitalization of over $20 billion. 42 Therefore, to succeed in proxy contests
(or better yet, to secure a favorable settlement with management and avoid the
expense of a proxy contest, which may cost upwards of $10 million), 43 the activist
hedge fund must secure the support of large institutional investors. 44
Accordingly, activist hedge funds engage in rigorous investor analysis before
deciding to target a firm. If the fund decides that there are too many unfriendly
institutional shareholders, it will be unlikely to intervene. 45 And if the fund chooses
to carry out the campaign, it will go to great lengths to make its case to large
institutional investors, generally after it has alerted the market to its presence with a
Schedule 13D filing. 46 The activist fund may also recruit other small hedge funds
before or after the announcement in a phenomenon known as “wolf-packing.” 47
Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and
Industry Concentration, REV. FIN. STUDIES (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 5–7); Alon Brav et al.,
Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 23, at 1750; Klein et al., supra note 23, at 226.
41 See Gordon and Gilson, supra note 5 (describing a “happy complementarity” between hedge fund
activists and institutional investors in which the activist frames and seeks to force governance changes
and will succeed only if the proposal can attract broad support from sophisticated institutional
investors).
42 2016 U.S. Shareholder Activism Review and Analysis: Activists Face Headwinds in 2016, Sullivan &
Cromwell Memos (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.sullcrom.com/2016-us-shareholder-activism-reviewand-analysis-activists-face-headwinds-in-2016.
43 Gantchev, supra note 23, at 9.
44 See Gordon and Gilson, supra note 5, at 897-900.
45 Empirical evidence shows that activist hedge funds typically target companies with a high level of
institutional ownership, consistent with theory that activists are more likely to intervene when they
can easily accumulate voting support. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The
Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance 28-39 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 521, 2015). A recent study likewise reveals that the presence of “activism-friendly” institutional
investors increases the likelihood that a firm will be targeted for hedge fund activism; accordingly, the
presence of activism-unfriendly institutional investors decreases the likelihood of becoming a target.
See Simi Kedia, Laura Starks, & Xianjue Wang, Institutional Owners and Hedge Fund Activism, Working
Paper, (forthcoming 2017).
46 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2012) (requiring any person acquiring beneficial ownership of any
equity security of more than 5% to file with SEC statement on Schedule 13D within ten days after
acquisition). As just one recent example, the activist hedge fund Jana Partners gauged potential
support from large institutional investors before making demands of management at Agrium. See
David Gelles & Michael K. De la Merced, New Alliances in the Battle for Corporate Control, N.Y. TIMES
(March 18, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/new-alliances-in-battle-for-corporatecontrol/?_r=0; see also Coffee and Palia, supra note 45; Mario Becht et al., supra note 31 (suggesting

11

The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting

Ultimately, the fund knows that it is critical to secure the support of one or more
institutional investors. 48 Doing so will not only help the activist accumulate voting
power, but will also signal credibility to other investors, making it more likely that
they will join in supporting the activist campaign. 49
As soon as the activist’s Schedule 13D becomes public, however, management
will begin a campaign of its own in an attempt to convince institutional investors that
the activist’s plan is short-sighted or problematic for other reasons. In fact, such
lobbying may occur even before an activist intervenes—there is evidence that
management views enhanced communications with large shareholders as an
important defense to hedge fund activism. 50
Therefore, even though institutional investors are unlikely to take an activist
position themselves, they play an important role in catalyzing hedge fund activist
campaigns. And institutional investors will occasionally initiate an activist campaign
by contacting hedge funds and informing them about underperforming portfolio
companies in the hope that a fund will intervene. 51 For these reasons, management
knows that when institutional investors are unhappy, there is a real risk of
displacement. And the very threat of this partnership can be sufficient to induce
management to focus on maximizing shareholder wealth. 52
shareholder activism is predominantly executed through private interventions both with target
management and with other institutions).
47 See Susan Pulliam et al., Activist Investors Often Leak Their Plans to a Favored Few: Strategically Placed Tips
Help Build Alliances for Campaigns at Target Companies, W ALL S T . J. (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304888404579381250791474792; Coffee
&
Palia, supra note 45; Briggs, supra note 35, at 686-94.
48 As an example, the activist hedge fund ValueAct was successful in obtaining a seat on Microsoft’s
board with less than 1% of stock because Microsoft recognized that other large institutional investors
supported the fund’s demand. See Gelles & De la Merced, supra note 46.
49 Ian Appel, Todd A. Gormley, & Donald B. Keim, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of
Passive Investors on Activism, NBER Working Paper No. 22707 (manuscript at 2), available at:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22707.
50 See PwC’s 2016 Annual Corporate Directors Survey, The Swinging Pendulum: Board Governance in the
Age of Shareholder Empowerment (Oct. 2016), available at: http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporategovernance/annual-corporate-directors-survey/top-10-findings.html (noting that “nearly four of five
directors say their board took proactive steps to prepare for actual or potential activism. About half
say their board regularly communicated with the companies’ largest investors and used a stockmonitoring service to provide regular updates about changes to company ownership…. A number of
directors also say their board took action by revising executive compensation plans or changing board
composition (21% and 16%, respectively).”).
51 According to Bill Ackman, founder of activist fund Pershing Square Capital, “Periodically, we are
approached by large institutions who are disappointed with the performance of companies they are
invested in to see if we would be interested in playing an active role in effectuating change.” He
reports that institutional investors even use an informal term for this phenomenon: “R.F.A.” or
request for activist. See Gelles & De la Merced, supra note 46.
52 See Gantchev, et al., Governance under the Gun, supra note 40 (finding that managers of peer firms view
activism in their industry as a threat and undertake real policy changes to mitigate it); PwC’s 2016
Annual Corporate Directors Survey, supra note 50, at 15 (noting that four out of five directors say that
the board took proactive steps, including altering compensation plans, identifying strategic
vulnerabilities, and changing the board compensation to reduce the risk of becoming a target of
activism).
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Institutional investors also discipline hedge fund activists: because of their voting
power, they are able to block interventions that they deem to be detrimental to the
long term health of the company. Accordingly, activists have begun to adjust their
tactics to match the priorities of institutional investors. For years, hedge fund
activists had focused on pushing for changes in business strategy, balance sheet
changes, divestitures, or selling the company. 53 The more recent trend in proxy
contests is to focus on board-related governance issues—issues that mutual funds
favor—and balance sheet campaigns have fallen by the wayside. 54 More study is
required to determine whether the presence of institutional investors is responsible
for this shift and whether these changes have benefitted shareholders. But perhaps
some of the evidence indicating that hedge fund activist interventions generally
increase firm value can be explained by institutional investors, who are unlikely to
support changes that do not benefit their long-term investors.
In sum, although institutional investors’ incentives are imperfect, there is
evidence that the presence of large, sophisticated investors with a financial interest in
the long-term health of portfolio companies has become an important corporate
governance safeguard.
III.

THE THREAT OF PASSIVE INVESTING

We are entering a new investment era brought on by the rise of passive investing
that has changed the corporate landscape once again. And the concentration of
assets in passive funds will create a far greater agency problem than has been
previously encountered—shareholders will be ceding control to investors with no
financial incentive to invest in monitoring management or securing good
governance.
This section begins by documenting the steep increase in assets invested in
passive funds. It then describes the acute incentive problems facing passive funds
and presents evidence supporting the theory that passive investing has the potential
to distort corporate governance and worsen agency costs at public companies.
A. The Rise of Passive Investing
Passive funds are funds whose investment securities are not chosen because of
their performance, but are instead automatically selected and weighted to match an
index or other subset of the market. Passive funds include index funds and ETFs,
both of which seek to replicate stock indices while minimizing expense ratios.
Although passive fund managers may initially exercise some judgment in creating the
fund by setting the philosophy of their portfolio and then determining how to track

S&C 2016 U.S. Shareholder Activism Review and Analysis (Nov. 28, 2016), available at:
https://www.sullcrom.com/2016-us-shareholder-activism-review-and-analysis-activists-faceheadwinds-in-2016.
54 Fichtner et al., supra note 22, at 2.
53

13

The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting

the index, the fund’s trading decisions are largely automated. For this reason, passive
funds generally charge much lower fees than active funds. 55
Passive funds have been around for a while—the modern index fund was
launched in the mid‐1970s by John Bogle, 56 the founder of the Vanguard Group—
and for over forty years, academics have touted their benefits for investors. 57 Studies
comparing active and passive funds likewise indicate that the majority of active funds
have not been able to consistently generate higher returns than benchmark indices
such as the S&P 500. 58 When they do, any increase in returns is often eaten away by
higher management fees. 59
But only very recently have investors embraced passive investing, and they have
done so wholeheartedly. Between 2008 and 2015, investors sold holdings of actively
managed equity mutual funds worth roughly $800 billion, while at the same time
buying approximately $1 trillion in passively managed funds. 60 This past year alone,
investors withdrew $340 billion from actively managed funds and invested $533
billion into passive funds, increasing the total amount of assets invested in passive
55 As of the end of 2015, the asset-weighted average net expense ratio was only 0.12 percent for U.S.
equity index funds, compared to 0.79 percent for U.S. actively managed equity funds. Oatricia Oey,
Average Fund Costs Continued to Decline in 2015, But Investors Are Not Necessarily Paying Less, Morningstar
Research
Library
(2016),
available
at:
http://corporate1.morningstar.com/ResearchArticle.aspx?documentId=750768.
56 See Zweig, supra note 2. In the 1930s, there existed something very similar to the modern index
mutual funds: fixed trusts, which had redeemable shares and fixed portfolios. But for unknown
reasons, they declined in popularity by the 1940s. See John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of
Investment Fund Regulation, 1936-1942, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 341 (2012).
57 In 1976, John Langbein and Richard Posner first advocated for an indexing approach, concluding
that “the trustee’s rational strategy . . . is to buy shares in a mutual fund or other investment vehicle
that holds the market portfolio—a market fund…. The advantages [of market funds] seem decisive: at
any given risk/return level, diversification is maximized and investment costs minimized.” Market
Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 30 (1976).
58 See William F. Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. BUS. 119, 137 (1966) (finding that a sample of
stock mutual funds underperformed the Dow Jones Industrial Average on a risk-adjusted basis);
Michael C. Jensen, Risk, the Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios, 42 J. BUS.
167, 239 (1969) (finding that mutual funds, on a risk-adjusted basis, had lower net returns than the
market as a whole); Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Funds, 52 J. FIN.
783, 787 (1996) (finding that actively managed funds had annual returns that were 65 basis points
below the applicable market indices); Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Decomposition: An Empirical
Decomposition into Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses, 55 J. FIN. 1655 (2000)
(finding that actively managed funds hold stocks that outperform the market, but on a net basis
underperform indices by 1%); Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, The Relation Between Price and
Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153 (2009) (finding underperformance of 21 to 71
basis points, depending on the set of controls).
59 Id.; Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 521,
550-51 (2009) (“[W]hen [active managed funds’] higher costs are taken into account, the average
actively managed dollar under-performs a passively managed index of securities…This account leaves
open the possibility that some actively managed funds will beat the market…Much, however,
conspires against the average investor picking out consistently above-average performers…. Investing
in an actively managed mutual fund is betting on one horse in a very crowded field…According to
one study, over a fifteen year period, 84% of actively managed mutual funds failed to yield returns in
excess of the stock market as a whole.”).
60 Fichtner et al., supra note 22, at 2.
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funds by 9 percent. 61 Assets under management in passive funds now represent $4
trillion, or 34% of the U.S. mutual fund market, up from just 4% in 1995. 62 And in
the past ten years, the share of total U.S. market capitalization held by passively
managed funds has quadrupled to more than 8%, or 12% of the S&P 500. 63
Fig. 1. Net Flows of U.S. Stock Market and Exchange Traded Funds

Source: Wall Street Journal

This rapid growth is predicted to continue. 64 Actively managed funds, on
average, have continued to underperform compared to market indices, making
passive funds look especially appealing. 65 And because global economic growth rates
are expected to remain low, low fee passive funds will continue to have a competitive
advantage. 66 Accordingly, Ernst & Young has forecasted annual growth rates for the
ETF industry of between 15 and 30 percent in the next few years. 67
PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts even more dramatic growth, estimating that assets
invested in ETFs will double annually until 2020. 68

61 Anne Tergesen and Jason Zweig, The Dying Business of Picking Stocks, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016),
available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dying-business-of-picking-stocks-1476714749.
62 Id. at 6.
63 Ian Appel, Todd A. Gormley, and Donald B. Keim, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, __J. FIN.
ECON. __ (manuscript at 49) (forthcoming).
64 See Madison Marriage, Large Investors Pull $350bn From Active Equity Funds, FIN. T. (Dec. 10, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/4418502e-be2e-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080 (describing the actively
managed fund industry’s bleak future).
65 Fichtner et al., supra note 22 at 6.
66 Sarah Krouse, Investors Leave Active Funds Despite Fee Cuts, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2017),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/active-funds-fee-cutting-doesnt-stem-investor-exodus-1483376271.
67
EY
Global
ETF
Survey:
2015
and
Beyond
(Oct.
7,
2014),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-global-etf-survey-2015-and-beyond/$FILE/ey-etfsurvey-2015-and-beyond.pdf.
68 Judith Evans and Jonathan Eley, Democratising Finance: How Passive Funds Changed Investing, FIN. T.
(2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b3c0c960-a56c-11e4-bf11-00144feab7de.html.
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Regulatory scrutiny of mutual fund fees has also fueled the growth of passive
funds. In April 2016, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued a final rule
expanding the “investment advice fiduciary” definition under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). 69 That rule, which went into
effect on June 9, 2017, requires investment advisers to act as fiduciaries when making
recommendations or giving advice on 401(k) plans or individual retirement accounts
(“IRAs”). 70 Similarly, in June 2016, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations announced that SEC examiners will scrutinize whether advisors have
conflicts of interest when making recommendations about share classes to their
clients. 71 The announcement makes clear that an investment advisor fails to uphold
its fiduciary duty when it causes a client to purchase a more expensive share class
when a less expensive share class is available. 72 And this enhanced scrutiny from the
DOL and SEC, combined with an uptick in litigation challenging mutual fund fees, 73
has encouraged investment advisors begin moving IRA assets—which represent $7
trillion—out of actively managed funds and into passive funds. 74
The surge in demand for passive funds has benefitted some institutional
investors more than others. That is because the passive fund industry is remarkably
concentrated—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street (the “Big Three”) together
See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice,
81 Fed. Reg. 20946, 20946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509–2510, and 2550).
70 See Tara Siegel Bernard, Obama’s Fiduciary Rule, After a Delay, Will Go Into Effect, N.Y. TIMES (May 23,
2017), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/obamas-fiduciary-rule-after-adelay-will-go-into-effect.html?_r=0. The rule was originally scheduled to be phased in beginning on
April 10, 2017 but the start date was delayed until June 9, 2017, with full implementation required by
July 1, 2019. Many observers wonder whether the delay may be extended indefinitely. See, e.g., Ashlea
Abeling, Will DOL Gut Fiduciary Rule By Latest July 1, 2019 Extension?, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2017), available
at:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2017/08/09/will-dol-gut-fiduciary-rule-by-latestjuly-1-2019-extension/#2779d4365840.
71 Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations Risk Alert, OCIE’s 2016 Share Class Initiative
(July
13,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/ocie-risk-alert-2016-share-classinitiative.pdf.
72 Id.
73 For the past ten years, the ERISA plaintiffs’ bar has been aggressively challenging fund fees, with a
growing emphasis on arguing the imprudence of active management in the administration of an
employee retirement plan. See Rosen v. Prudential Retirement Ins & Annuity Co et al., No. 3:2015cv01839
(D. Conn. 2016) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the employer’s selection of higher-cost actively
managed mutual funds rather than passively managed funds violated ERISA); Taylor v. United Techs.
Corp., No. 3:06-CV-1494, 2009 WL 535779, at *10 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2009), aff’d, 354 F. App’x 525
(2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the presence of a high concentration of mutual funds
with revenue-sharing arrangements violated ERISA despite expert evidence in support of the notion
that actively-managed mutual funds generally underperform passive index funds). This liability risk has
pushed some companies to switch their retirement accounts from actively managed funds to index
funds. See, e.g., Tergeson and Zweig, supra note 61 (describing how the Illinois State Board of
Investment voted to convert its $4 billion 401(k) plan for state workers to an all-index plan in the face
of increased liability risk).
74 John Waggoner, DOL Rule Silver Lining? It May Trigger a Shift of $1 Trillion to ETFs,
INVESTMENTNEWS
(Apr.
3,
2016),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160403/FREE/304039997/dol-rule-silver-lining-it-maytrigger-a-shift-of-1-trillion-to-etfs.
69
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hold 70% of the ETF market. 75 Index fund market share data are not publically
available, but recent estimates put Vanguard as holding 75% of the market. 76
And as a result of the growth of passive investing, the Big Three have become
significant players in governance. In 2015, the Big Three together constituted the
largest owner of nearly 90% of public companies in the S&P 500, which is up from
25% in 2000. 77 When considering all listed companies in the U.S., together the Big
Three were the single largest shareholder at least 40% of the time. 78 In 2016, passive
funds from just one manager—Vanguard—controlled 5% or more of shares in 468
companies in the S&P 500. Ten years ago, the number of companies was only
three. 79
Although the cause of increased demand for passive funds is benign, some
financial commentators have predicted that the growing concentration of assets in
the hands of passive investors may have harmful market effects. One worry is that
passive investing will increase investor herding behavior and lead to more correlated
market movements, exacerbating the pro-cyclicality of financial markets. 80 A related
concern is that widespread passive investment will reduce stock market pricing
efficiency because certain companies, such as those listed on the S&P 500, will
always have a ready market for their shares. Moreover, stock in companies that are
not listed on an index may have fewer possible buyers, causing those companies to
become undervalued. 81 Even Bogle admitted that if everyone were to index, there
would be “chaos without limit. You [couldn’t] buy or sell, there [would be] no
liquidity, there [would be] no market.” 82 But he explained that perverse market
effects would not manifest until investment in passive funds rose to about 90% of
the equity market. 83
The legal literature has generally focused on a different problem created by the
rise of institutional investing—the prospect for anticompetitive behavior by
Fichtner et al., supra note 22, at 6.
Id.
77 Posner et al., supra note 7, at 7.
78 Fichtner et al., supra note 22, at 17.
79 Dennis K. Berman and Jamie Heller, Wall Street’s Do-Nothing Revolution, WALL ST. J. (Oct 17, 2016),
http://graphics.wsj.com/passivists/.
80 See Andrew Haldane, The Age of Asset Management?, Speech at the London Business School (April 2,
2014), available at:
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech723.pdf.
81 Russ Wermers and Tong Yao, Active vs. Passive Investing and the Efficiency of Individual Stock Prices,
Working Paper, University of Iowa and University of Maryland (May 2010), available at:
https://finance.unimannheim.de/fileadmin/files/areafinance/files/Paper_Finance_Seminar/Wermers.pdf; Inigo FraserJenkins et al., The Silent Road to Serfdom: Why Passive Investing is Worse Than Marxism, Sanford C.
Bernstein & Co., LLC (Aug. 23, 2016); but see Miles Johnson, Why Active Fund Managers Should Cheer the
Rise of ETFs, FIN. T. (Dec. 7, 2016) (contending that actively managed funds should view the rise of
passive funds as opportunities to exploit undervalued stocks that are not suitable for inclusion on
indices).
82 Zweig, supra note 2.
83 Id.
75
76
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institutional investors with large ownership stakes across competitor firms. Sparked
by empirical research showing that common institutional ownership is correlated
with higher prices in at least two concentrated U.S. industries, 84 Eric Posner, Fiona
Morton, and E. Glen Weyl, as well as Einer Elhauge, have asserted that institutional
investors may pressure managers to refrain from aggressive price competition
because of their substantial interests in rival companies. 85
The next section provides an alternative explanation—the problem is not that
powerful institutional investors are pressuring management to compete less
aggressively, but that a growing share of the market is not doing as much to monitor
and discipline management. When those passive investors do intervene, they will
pursue an unthinking and automated approach to governance that is unlikely to be in
the company’s best interest. And if this trend continues, the scope of the problem is
potentially much larger than the threat of anticompetitive conduct because it extends
beyond companies in oligopolistic industries, and concerns all companies with a high
concentration of passive ownership, which is a large and growing segment of the
U.S. market.
B. Passive Investing and Corporate Governance
A passive fund’s goal is to replicate the performance of a market index, and so
the fund’s exit opportunities are limited. For this reason, one might suppose that a
passive fund’s incentives are closely aligned with those of its long-term investors. 86
But passive funds face acute collective action and agency problems that render their
thoughtful participation in governance unlikely.

José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership, Ross
School
of
Business
Paper
No.
1235
(2016),
available
at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2427345 (examining within-route airline ticket
price variation over time and showing that common ownership correlates with increases in ticket
prices); José Azar, Sahil Raina, and Martin Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition, Ross
School
of
Business
Working
Paper
(2016),
available
at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710252. The evidence of higher prices in
certain industries is not inconsistent with my theory; indeed, Azar et al. theorized that a lack of
investor demand for competition could result in an equilibrium with reduced competition and
sustained high profit margins. See Anti-Competitive Effects, supra note 84, at 4-5. But I argue that the
potential for anticompetitive behavior is only one facet of this problem, and that a lack of investor
discipline would likely also lead to heightened agency costs. And the agency cost problem extends
beyond companies in concentrated industries, with the potential to generate welfare losses across the
entire market.
85 Posner et al., supra note 7; Elhauge, supra note 7.
86 See e.g., Strine, Can We Do Better?, supra note 5, at 478 (“Precisely because index funds do not sell
stocks in their target index, those funds have a unique interest in corporations pursuing fundamentally
sound strategies that will generate the most durable wealth for stockholders. Index fund investors do
not benefit by bubbles that burst. Index fund investors also have a more durable interest in the
prospects of the corporations in the index than investors in actively traded funds. Actively traded
funds turn over at a rate which makes it difficult to believe that their managers are basing their
decisions on a genuine assessment of the corporations’ long-term cash flow prospects as opposed to
their speculation about where the market is heading.”).
84
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Because a passive fund seeks only to match the performance of a market index—
not outperform it—it lacks a financial incentive to ensure that the companies in their
portfolio are well run. 87 In the first place, a passive fund portfolio is highly diversified
and therefore includes many more companies than the typical actively managed
mutual fund. For example, an S&P 500 tracker fund (one of the more popular
passive fund options) generally consists of 500 portfolio companies, more than five
times the amount in the average actively managed mutual fund. 88 This means that
any investment in improving governance at a single portfolio company will be even
less likely to impact the fund’s overall performance. 89
In addition, passive funds face an acute collective action problem because a
beneficial governance intervention will improve the performance of all funds
tracking the index. Unlike actively managed funds, which can modify the weight of a
portfolio company based on its expected performance and out-compete rival funds
with strategic investments in governance, passive funds hold stock in proportion to
the company’s weight on a market index. A passive fund that invests in governance,
therefore, would improve the performance of all rival passive funds in equal
measure. And investing in governance would also benefit active funds—in fact,
active funds are able to reap even greater benefits from the passive fund’s investment
because they can overweight the target company upon learning about the
intervention. In other words, any investment in governance would benefit
competitor funds while simultaneously driving up the passive fund’s costs.
Therefore, unless the intervention were costless, it would be certain to harm the
passive fund’s relative performance.
But thoughtful interventions are especially costly for passive funds, which
generally lack local knowledge—“knowledge of people, of local conditions, and of
special circumstances”—of the firms that they invest in. 90 Because of its automated
87 To understand the power of their commitment to the indexing strategy, consider that passive funds
may refuse to tender into an offer to purchase their shares at a premium, even if they view the deal as
beneficial, so long as the stock is still included in the index that the fund is tracking. That is because
the gap between the offer price and the market price, as well as the gap in time between the tender
and the squeeze-out, interferes with the fund’s ability to track the index. See Some Tender Offer Quirks,
Kirkland
&
Ellis
M&A
Update
(Oct.
9,
2009),
available
at:
https://www.kirkland.com/files/MA_Update/100909.pdf.
88 David M. Smith and Hany Shawky, Optimal Number of Stock Holdings in Mutual Fund Portfolios Based on
Market Performance, 40 FIN. REV. 481, tbl.2 (showing that in 2000, the mean number of companies in a
mutual fund portfolio was 92).
89 The literature has previously deemed “neutral” shareholders as those who have entered into a
derivative transaction that negates all the economic risk associated with the underlying position in its
shares. See Frank Partnoy, U.S. Hedge Fund Activism, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER
POWER 13-14 (forthcoming 2015); Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden
Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011 (2006). This paper expands the
concept of a neutral shareholder to include highly diversified passive fund managers who lack any
incentive to invest in improving the performance of the firms within the fund’s portfolio.
90 Freidrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). This is somewhat
less true for index funds that sample firms in order to replicate the performance of an index—those
funds may need to readjust their portfolio if one company begins to underperform relative to the
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trading strategy, a passive fund does not monitor the fundamentals of companies in
its broad portfolio. 91 The consequence of this passive approach to trading is that a
proactive and informed approach to governance requires the passive fund to incur
additional expenses associated with identifying underperforming companies,
pinpointing the reason for their underperformance, and then determining the most
effective way to intervene. 92 This also means that it will be expensive for the fund to
thoughtfully evaluate shareholder proposals and governance interventions proposed
by other investors. A passive fund that incurred these expenses would need to charge
a higher fee, which would likely drive fee-sensitive investors to competitor funds. 93
In sum, passive investing exacerbates agency and collective action problems
associated with intermediated finance—although investors desire good governance,
they are not willing to pay the fees necessary to secure it and would instead prefer to
free ride on the investments of others. The same is true for passive fund managers,
who will not invest in improving firm governance because any such investment will
harm the fund’s competitiveness. Therefore, unlike active funds, passive managed
funds have no financial incentive to monitor management or invest in governance
interventions. Or, as Bogle has explained, historically, index funds managers
traditionally (and rationally) believed that they should leave the performance of the
companies in their portfolios to “the invisible hand of the marketplace.” 94
Therefore, as demand for passive funds continues to fuel an influx of assets from
active funds, it is likely that the market for corporate influence will experience two
dramatic changes. First, a growing share of corporate owners will have substantially
weakened incentives to monitor and discipline management or invest in improving
governance. Second, there is the risk that passive fund voting will do more harm
than good. This is because passive fund managers will be especially likely to adhere
to a low-cost, unthinking approach to governance, such as automatically voting “yes”
to any shareholder proposal that meets pre-determined qualifications. Passive funds
industry. But even in that case, those funds would have no incentive to determine why the fund is
underperforming and then expend resources to try to improve firm performance.
91 Vanguard has emphasized that the funds are able to charge low fees because they do not expend
resources investigating individual companies or meeting with managers. See Frank Partnoy, Are Index
Funds Evil?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017).
92 Moreover, the Big Three, by virtue of their very large stakes in many public companies, risk
triggering Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934 when they intervene in company performance.
Section 13(d) subjects investment managers with a 5% or greater investment in a company to
extensive disclosure requirements. But so long as the investment manager does not exercise “control,”
which includes nominating directors and waging a proxy contest, they will be subject to much more
limited disclosure requirements under Schedule 13G. See John Morley, Too Big to Be Active: Large
Investment Managers, Conflicts of Interest, and the High Costs of Corporate Control (Working Paper). This rule
may cause investment managers with large investments to avoid taking any actions that could be
viewed as seeking to gain influence.
93 See generally Yang Sun, The Effect of Index Fund Competition on Money Management Fees, Working Paper
(forthcoming 2017); Lisa Beilfuss, Readers React: Low Fees Are Driving Us Into Passive Funds, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/readers-react-low-fees-are-driving-us-into-passivefunds-1477318719. Note that the fee-sensitivity of investors is somewhat disputed. See Erik Sirri and
Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589 (1998).
94 Krouse et al., supra note 2.

20

The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting

will also be especially likely to succumb to their serious conflicts of interest. Most
prominently, they will have an incentive to vote with management—an important
source of defined contribution plan assets, which are a large and growing pool of
capital invested in index funds. 95
Moreover, governance distortions associated with passive fund ownership will
likely materialize well before stock price inefficiencies manifest. That is because that
the market for corporate influence requires more active participation to remain
efficient than is necessary to keep the stock market’s pricing efficient. If only a small
number of investors actively trade based on information about the company, the
stock price will incorporate that information. But a small number of active investors
cannot so easily influence governance outcomes, meaning that governance
inefficiencies arising from passive investing would arise much sooner. 96
Consider the following example: Company Y is 51% owned by passive funds and
those funds have internal guidelines that state that the funds will vote yes to any
proposal that results in greater board independence. A shareholder files a proposal
that purports to make the board of directors more independent by separating the
CEO from the chairman. The passive funds lack firm-specific knowledge and thus
do not know whether this controversial proposal would actually improve shareholder
value. And yet, because passive funds adhere to their voting guidelines closely, the
proposal will pass, even if all other active shareholders oppose it. 97
As another example, consider Company X, which is also 51% owned by passive
funds. Informed investors have decided that Company X is underperforming and
that an intervention would improve firm efficiency, but management will successfully
oppose the intervention unless a majority of shareholders support it. Let us further
assume that the intervention is not blessed by the passive funds’ voting guidelines.
Rather than expend resources to determine whether the intervention is beneficial, the

95 In 2015, 401(k) assets under management totaled $4.7 trillion, with 60% held in mutual funds. Sean
Collins et al., The Economics of Providing 401(k) Plans: Services, Fees, and Expenses, ICI Research
Perspective (2016), available at: http://www.ici.org/pdf/per22-04.pdf; see also Simon C. Y. Wong, How
Conflicts of Interest Thwart Institutional Investor Stewardship, BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L.
481 (Sept. 2011), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925485. And there are examples that indicate
that management is willing to use its power as a client to send a strong message. As just one example,
in 1990, Armstrong World Industries, a strong supporter of a Pennsylvania antitakeover law, switched
its $180 million employee savings plan to Fidelity from Vanguard after Fidelity withdrew its
opposition to the new law. See Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 18, at 602.
96 Zweig, supra note 2.
97 Whether to separate the CEO and chairman positions is a hotly contested issue in corporate
governance. In recent years, the trend has consistently moved toward separation in spite of the fact
that the empirical evidence does not find it to be unambiguously positive. David F. Larcker and Brian
Tayan, Chairman and CEO: The Controversy Over Board Leadership Structure, Stanford Closer Look Series
(June 24, 2016), available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2800244. In fact, there is little evidence that
separating the two positions really improves firm performance or governance quality, and a recent
study has found that forced separation due to shareholder pressure is associated with a decrease in
market valuation and lower future operating performance. See Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel, and Xiaohui
Liu, CEO And Board Chair Roles: To Split or Not to Split?, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1595 (2011).
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passive fund manager would likely do nothing or vote with management, meaning
that the intervention would fail, even if all informed shareholders support it.
Two features of the passive fund industry dissipate some of these concerns.
First, passive funds may be able to free ride off of information from active funds
housed within the same institution. As of June 2016, Vanguard and BlackRock each
had 19% of their equity assets under management invested in actively managed
funds, while State Street had 3%. 98 And when an institution has investment overlap
between active and passive funds, there is the possibility of beneficial information
sharing that increases the likelihood of informed voting. 99
As an example, last year, BlackRock’s passive funds changed their vote on a high
profile merger based on advice from active fund managers. The issue was a proposed
$18 billion merger between professional-service providers Towers Watson and Willis
Group. Towers Watson investors disliked the proposed terms: a package of cash and
shares in the combined company worth less than Towers’ stock price on the date the
deal was announced. Yet the deal was expected to increase revenue and decrease
costs for Towers Watson, meaning that shareholders would capture the upside from
the deal later. 100 Both ISS and Glass Lewis recommended a “no” vote (in a position
that was called “short-termist” by other proxy advisors) 101 and BlackRock’s passive
team initially agreed, but the institution’s active fund portfolio managers supported
the deal and eventually convinced their colleagues to do the same. 102 And because of
BlackRock’s change of heart, the deal was approved by shareholders.
Information sharing can therefore reduce the risk of bad outcomes, but
investment overlap between active and passive funds is not always guaranteed. This
is because active funds invest in far fewer companies than passively managed funds.
Moreover, as assets continue to flow out of actively managed funds, causing them to
close or lay off investment analysts, 103 there will be less generation of information
See Fichtner et al., supra note 22, at 7 tbl.1.
For some evidence that beneficial information sharing occurs across large institutional investors, see
Michelle Lowry and Peter Iliev, Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?, 28 REV. FIN. STUDIES 446 (2015)
(demonstrating that, although 25% of mutual funds blindly follow ISS recommendations, larger
mutual funds and funds that belong to larger fund families engage in active voting more often and
theorizing that this is because those large funds can spread their research costs and benefits across
various funds).
100 Paul J. Davies, Towers Watson-Willis Merger: Battle to Save a Dubious Deal, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/towers-watson-willis-merger-battle-to-save-a-dubious-deal-1447950545.
101 Leanna Orr, Critics React to Contentious Towers Watson Merger, CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER
HEADLINES (Dec. 15, 2015): http://www.ai-cio.com/channel/newsmakers/critics-react-tocontentious-towers-watson-merger/
102 Krouse et al., supra note 2.
103 This has already begun to happen at the Big Three: recently, State Street and BlackRock reported
record high layoffs even as passive funds—their primary investment vehicles—experience a record
influx of assets. See Sarah Krouse, BlackRock to Cut About 400 Jobs, WALL ST. J. (March 30, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-to-cut-about-400-jobs-1459370775
(reporting
that
BlackRock plans to cut about 400 jobs, or three percent of its workforce, in the largest round of
layoffs to date); Ross Kerber, State Street Net Income Flat, Plans Job Cuts, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/statestreet-results-idUSL1N12N17320151023 (reporting that State
98
99
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and thus less beneficial spillover. The rise of passive investing, therefore, makes it
increasingly likely that institutional investors will have a substantial passive presence
in a company without guidance from active fund managers.
The second complicating feature of the passive fund industry is the fact that
largely passive institutions, like many other large institutional investors, locate voting
and engagement efforts for passive funds in a centralized corporate governance
team. 104 In theory, a well-staffed group of engaged employees who are capable of
thoughtfully directing fund votes and engaging with management would lessen many
of the concerns identified in this paper. The following subsections describe what we
know about the structure and governance efforts of the Big Three’s governance
groups, which indicate that they are not yet up to the task. The next subsections also
discuss evidence indicating that the rise of passive investing may already be distorting
the outcome of shareholder votes, as well as the substance of hedge fund activist
campaigns.
i.

Passivity, Voting, and Engagement

The Big Three advertise that their governance groups are active participants in
firm governance, but a closer look induces some skepticism about these claims. 105
Those governance groups do not have their pay tied to the funds’ performance. 106
They are also understaffed: Vanguard employs 15 people devoted to engagement and
voting at about 13,000 companies based around the world, BlackRock employs
about 20 people who work on governance issues at some 14,000 companies, and
State Street employs fewer than 10 people devoted to governance issues at around
Street plans to cut 600 jobs worldwide); Deirdre Fernandes, State Street Corp. Eyes 7,000 Layoffs by 2020,
BOSTON GLOBE (March 29, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/03/29/statestreet-official-pegs-staff-reduction-workers/89HmTzw98F6AvUCVyA9A4I/story.html
(reporting
that State Street announced at an investor conference plans to lay off up to 7000 workers in the next
three years “to become a more tech-driven company … less reliant on manual trades”).
104 See Charles M. Nathan, The Parallel Universes of Institutional Investing and Institutional Voting, Harv. L.
Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Apr. 6, 2010), available at:
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/04/06/the-parallel-universes-ofinstitutional-investingand-institutional-voting/#10b (noting that many larger investment managers have staff dedicated to
voting all portfolio companies’ shares and that this staff “typically is entirely separate from the
portfolio managers and reports either to the general counsel or senior compliance officer of the
investment manager, not to the investing function”).
105 BlackRock, for example, explains that its engagement program “is focused on protecting and
enhancing the economic value of the companies in which it invests on behalf of clients” through
engagement with boards and management of investee companies. BlackRock, Global Corporate
Governance
and
Engagement
Principles
(2014),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/enbr/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-1engprinciples-global-122011.pdf.
Vanguard
likewise emphasizes that it takes an active approach to engagement to “ensure that [its portfolio]
companies’ policies and practices in relation to corporate governance matters support the creation of
long-term value for investors.” Vanguard, Vanguard’s Approach to Corporate Governance,
https://americas.vanguard.com/institutional/about-vanguard/our-approach-to-corporategovernance.htm; see also State Street, Global Proxy Voting and Governance Principles (March 2016),
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2016/Global-ProxyVoting-and-Engagement-Principles-20160301.pdf.
106 Rock, supra note 5, at 10.

23

The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting

9,000 companies. 107 Put differently, each member of Vanguard’s governance team is
tasked with making governance decisions for nearly one thousand companies, even
though Vanguard is likely to be one of the company’s largest shareholders.
Given the number of companies the engagement teams are charged with
overseeing, simply voting the shares, without even considering how to vote them, is
an enormous task. 108 It would not be possible for teams of that size to prepare
corporate governance reports, issue and evaluate governance guidelines, research and
thoughtfully vote proxies, and also meet with management and the board.
Accordingly, the engagement teams do not use an active voting strategy and instead
promulgate voting guidelines and follow them closely. They also outsource voting
decisions to proxy advisor services: BlackRock reports that its governance team relies
on ISS and Glass Lewis to help summarize proxy statements and devotes close
analysis only when those services have identified an issue. 109 State Street and
Vanguard similarly utilize ISS as a voting agent and a provider of research for certain
proxy issues. 110
In spite of the fact that there are no generally accepted best practices for
governance, the Big Three have adopted nearly identical voting guidelines: each
institution articulates a preference for director independence, some relationship
between long-term company performance and executive compensation, and
skepticism about anti-takeover provisions and major changes to the corporation,
such as mergers, reorganizations, or changes to capital structure. 111
SEC regulations shed some light on the topics chosen for inclusion. In 2003,
when announcing that investment managers have a fiduciary obligation to vote
proxies responsibly and in the interests of their investors, the SEC provided
guidance on appropriate topics for mutual fund voting guidelines:
Krouse et al., supra note 2. On the opposite end of the spectrum is activist hedge fund Pershing
Square Capital Management that has an investment team of eight, as well as several additional
employees, that together oversee a portfolio of twelve companies. Id.
108 See Strine, Can We Do Better?, supra note 5, at 475 (explaining that institutional investors holding
broad portfolios are required to cast thousands of votes every year).
109 Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders, Quietly Stirring, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-shareholding-giant-is-quietlystirring.html.
110 State Street Global Advisors, Global Proxy Voting and Engagement Principles (March 2016), supra note
105; Eleanor Bloxham, Shareholder Research Firms Are Not the Enemy, FORTUNE (Mar. 19, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/03/19/shareholder-research-firms-are-not-the-enemy/.
One might conclude that this delegation is beneficial, but proxy advisors themselves adhere to
one-size-fits-all voting policies, lack a financial interest in the portfolio company, and suffer from
conflicts of interest that undermine the value of their proxy voting guidance. See Charles M. Nathan,
Proxy Advisory Business: Apotheosis or Apogee?, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
and
Financial
Regulation
(March
23,
2011),
available
at:
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/03/23/proxy-advisory-business-apotheosis-or-apogee/;
Robert M. Krasne, Proxy-Voting Concern: ISS Wields Extraordinary Clout in Recommendations to Investors, Yet
Also Provides Services to Corporations, PENSIONS & INVES., May 31, 2004, at 12,
http://www.pionline.com/article/20040531/PRINTSUB/405310706/1026/TOC.
111 Id.; BlackRock, Global Corporate Governance and Engagement Principles, supra note 105; Vanguard,
Vanguard’s Approach to Corporate Governance, supra note 105.
107
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The following are examples of specific types of issues [for] which
disclosure would be appropriate [in the voting guidelines]: Corporate
governance matters, including changes in the state of incorporation,
mergers and other corporate restructurings, and anti-takeover
provisions such as staggered boards, poison pills, and supermajority
provisions; Changes to capital structure, including increases and
decreases of capital and preferred stock issuance; Stock option plans
and other management compensation issues; and Social and
corporate responsibility issues. 112
On the substance of each of these issues, the Big Three’s voting guidelines generally
follow recommendations from proxy advisors like ISS and Glass Lewis, which
likewise embrace one-size-fits-all voting policies. 113
The Big Three closely adhere to their voting guidelines and are thus able to
achieve lock-step consistency in voting across funds. At BlackRock in 2015, in only
18 per 100,000 of shareholder proposals, one of their funds did not vote along with
the other funds. Likewise, at Vanguard, only 6 out of 100,000 proposals featured a
fund voting differently than its other funds. 114 State Street also showed a low level of
internal disagreement, voting inconsistently in 195 per 100,000 proposals. 115 By
contrast, Fidelity (which has only 16% of its equity invested in passive funds) had
internal disagreement in 3,144 of 100,000 votes. 116 This difference is likely due to the
fact that institutions tend to give active fund managers freedom to cast the fund’s
votes, and different fund managers will reasonably reach different conclusions for
controversial proposals, or have varying perspectives based on the differing needs of
their investors. This lock-step consistency, therefore, suggests that a centralized
voting strategy may not be in the best interests of all investors.
In light of the their growing market share and uniform preferences, it is not
surprising that the Big Three may already be influencing election outcomes. The first
and only study to consider this issue has shown that an increase in passive fund
ownership is correlated with a higher likelihood of implementation of the
shareholder governance proposals that are favored by the Big Three, including

See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies, Release Nos. 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922, 2003 SEC Lexis 3143 at *23-24.
(2003).
113 See Nathan, Proxy Advisory Business, supra note 111 (“[A]s everyone connected with the institutional
shareholder voting process knows or should know, proxy advisors’ voting recommendations are
driven by inflexible, one-size-fits-all voting policies and simplistic analytic models designed to utilize
standard and easily accessible inputs that can be derived from readily available data and to avoid any
need for particularized research or the application of meaningful judgment.”).
114 Fitchner, supra note 22, at 20-21.
115 Id.
116 Id.
112

25

The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting

proposals that increase board independence, remove poison pills and other takeover
defenses, 117 and eliminate dual class structures. 118
We should be wary of this trend. Decades of scholarship have failed to generate
consensus about what good governance is, concluding that it is endogenous to the
particular firm. And there is reason to believe that one-size-fits-all governance
solutions imposed across vastly different firms will make all firms worse off. For
example, a recent study finds a statistically negative impact on stock price as the
result of certain compensation changes made in response to comments from proxy
advisory firms. 119 Another study reports similar results after the implementation of
stock option exchange programs recommended by ISS. 120
But voting is only part of the story. As discussed, engagement is perceived by
institutional investors to be the most important and effective way to influence and
discipline management. How do engagement efforts by the Big Three fare?
One could argue that passive funds strategically remove takeover defenses in the hope that the
external threat of a takeover will discipline management and obviate the need for shareholder
monitoring. But there are problems with this argument. First, a hostile takeover is a very expensive
option—“only a badly mismanaged target can justify the typical 50% takeover premium.” Black,
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 18, at 522. Hostile takeovers also face strong legal obstacles,
most notably, state antitakeover statutes. See Guhan Subramanian, Is Delaware’s Antitakeover Statute
Unconstitutional?, 65 BUS. LAW. 685, 734, 721-722 (2010). Large public companies are especially
unlikely to be the targets of hostile takeovers in light of the expense and regulatory hurdles of
purchasing control. Finally, purchasing control is often more than is necessary to correct a problem:
for companies with competent managers who could benefit from closer oversight, a takeover is a
disproportionate remedy and one that creates large disruption and transaction costs. See Black,
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 18, at 522.
118 Appel et al., Passive Investors, supra note 63, at 4-5. This same study revealed that although
institutions with a higher share of passive fund assets vote with management almost 90% of the time,
the number is slightly lower than it is for funds with a high percentage of assets in active funds. Id.
But this result does not necessarily prove that passive funds are active voters—to the contrary, it is
also consistent with the theory that passively managed funds follow their voting guidelines or defer to
proxy advisors even when the better choice is to vote with management.
The study also found that an increase in passive ownership was correlated with a small
increase in a company’s return on assets. Id. The authors suggest that this evidence indicates that
passive fund ownership was the reason for these beneficial changes, but there are other explanations:
for example, companies with higher concentration of passive fund ownership often have a high
concentration of active fund ownership, too. See Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do Mutual Fund
Investors Get What They Pay For? The Legal Consequences of Closet Index Funds, __VA. L. BUS. REV__
(forthcoming 2017) (showing that a number of high fee active funds in fact hold portfolios that
substantially overlap with market indices). Although Cremers and Curtis characterize “closet
indexing,” which occurs when active funds largely track an index with the exception of a few big bets,
as an abusive practice, this paper shows that it may provide a benefit. If closet index fund managers
are motivated to act as stewards of portfolio companies in order to determine which companies
should be overweighted relative to the index, all investors will benefit from this investment.
In sum, the fact that active funds may also favor companies that are listed on indices may
drive some of performance results found in the Appel study. But as investors continue to shift assets
from active to passive funds, this protection will recede.
119 See generally Larcker et al., supra note 22. Other studies have found similar results. See Do Proxy
Advisors Say on Pay Voting Policies Improve TSR?, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
and Financial Regulation (Apr. 20, 2015).
120 See David Larcker, Alan McCall, & Gaizka Ormazabal, Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option
Exchanges: The Case of ISS, Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper (2011).
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Engagement is difficult to evaluate, but Vanguard and BlackRock both report the
number of meetings with management annually: in 2015, BlackRock reported 1,421
engagements worldwide. 121 About a third of these constituted engagements with U.S.
companies, and only 13% were categorized as “extensive” (as opposed to
“moderate” or “basic”). 122 Likewise, Vanguard reported 800 worldwide engagements,
or “conversations,” with management and directors (State Street does not report
engagement data). 123
These numbers appear high, but they indicate that the vast majority of portfolio
companies—at least 12,200 in the case of Vanguard—were neglected. These
engagement efforts are also dwarfed by those of institutional investors that favor an
active investing strategy. For example, in 2015, Fidelity International, a small
institutional investor with an active investment approach (not to be confused with
Fidelity Investments, which does not report its annual engagements), 124 reported
1,001 engagements conducted by its governance and engagement team. 125 But that
number does not include over 16,000 company meetings and visits by analysts and
other employees as part of “the normal conduct of [their] business.” 126 T. Rowe
Price, a large institutional investor that invests only 8.9% of its assets under
management in passive funds, similarly reports that the majority of meetings are
“driven by portfolio managers and supported by the expertise of … industry-focused
analysts,” and that corporate engagements merely supplement due diligence meetings
conducted by analysts in the ordinary course of investing. 127
In other words, active fund analysts, not members of corporate governance
teams, are the primary drivers of informal meetings and interactions with
management. The rise of passive investing is therefore likely to affect not only proxy
voting outcomes, but also the occurrence and efficacy of investor meetings with
management—perhaps the most important form of institutional investor
BlackRock, Investment Stewardship Report, Voting and Engagement Quarterly Statistics (Oct. 1, 2015–Sept.
30, 2016), available at: https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-br/literature/fact-sheet/blk-votingengagement-annual-figures-q2-2015-q1-2016.pdf.
122 Id.
123 Vanguard, Our Engagement Efforts and Proxy Voting: An Update (June 30, 2016), available at:
https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/update-on-voting/index.html.
Vanguard
explains that its index funds are able to charge low fees because fund managers need not incur the
costs of meeting with companies. Indeed, according to a Vanguard representative, index fund
managers never engage with companies about their businesses because doing so would require the
fund to make new regulatory filings and change their investment guidelines. See Partnoy, Are Index
Funds Evil?, supra, note 91.
124 Fidelity International has $290 billion in assets under management. See Fidelity International:
About Us, available at: https://www.fidelityinternational.com/global/about/default.page?.
125
Fidelity International, Governance and Engagement Report (2015), available at:
http://www.fidelityilf.com/assets/pdf/governance-engagement-report.pdf. By contrast, Vanguard
has $4 trillion assets under management and BlackRock, $5 trillion. Sarah Krouse, Vanguard Reaches $4
Trillion for First Time, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguardreaches-4trillion-for-first-time-1486745349.
126 Id.
127
T.
Rowe
Price,
Building
on
Our
Values,
at
*5
(2014),
https://www3.troweprice.com/usis/content/dam/trowecorp/Pdfs/CSRReport2014.pdf.
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influence. 128 When that happens, fewer agreements will be reached in back room
conversations; instead, investor influence, when it occurs at all, will come in the form
of costly proxy contests.
ii.

Passivity and Hedge Fund Activism

As the composition of institutional investors moves toward passivity, in theory,
those investors will also be less likely to serve as a keel to hedge fund activism. 129
Recall that active funds generally have the incentive and ability to evaluate activist
interventions and then catalyze those that are deemed beneficial, while refusing to
support those that are not in the interests of their long-term investors.
Passive funds, again, are different. Even the most beneficial intervention will not
improve the passive fund’s relative performance, nor will it materially improve
portfolio returns. Thus, a passive fund manager is unlikely to support an activist
unless doing so is costless. But there are a few reasons to think that partnering with
an activist would be expensive for passive funds. First, because passive funds lack
information about the company and its performance, they would need to invest time
and resources to evaluate the activist’s proposal. Second, supporting an activist
would cause the fund to incur the costs of interfacing with management and
potentially participating in litigation. 130
Third, a passive fund manager will likely worry that supporting an activist could
jeopardize her relationship with the target company and put the fund at risk of losing
corporate pension fund assets. 131 Not only that, the company might be a client for
the institution’s investment services. 132 And because securities law requires funds to

In addition to being infrequent, engagement by passive funds is relatively ineffective because
passive funds lack a credible exit threat: their indexing strategy often requires them to hold stock
regardless of the company’s performance. Indeed, the prospect of tracking error might even force
passive fund managers to buy in situations where they would prefer to sell. See McCahery et al., supra
note 20, at 16.
129 In addition, the decline of actively managed mutual funds could make hedge fund activism more
costly, as there will be fewer analysts identifying problematic companies and tipping off hedge fund
activists.
130 Robert C. Pozen, The Role of Institutional Investors in Curbing Corporate Short-Termism, 71 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 81 (Oct. 2015).
131 As activist hedge fund manager William A. Ackman explained in a letter to investors, “corporate
pension fund assets are one of the largest pools of capital invested in index funds. It does not help
index fund managers win business from corporate America if they have a reputation for being an
activist or if they support activists. In fact, the opposite is likely true. If their reputation is more for
protecting incumbent management than for supporting activists, they are much more likely to garner
assets from corporate pension plans than index fund managers who are known to vote against
management.”
Pershing
Square
Annual
Letter
(Jan.
26,
2016),
https://assets.pershingsquareholdings.com/2014/09/Pershing-Square-2015-Annual-Letter-PSHJanuary-26-2016.pdf; see also Wong, supra note 95; Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 18,
at 602.
132 Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 24, at 19.
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disclose all votes, 133 votes cast in favor of activist investors are impossible to hide
from actual and potential clients. 134
It is increasingly evident that management views close relationships with
institutional investors as a primary defense against investor activism. 135 Indeed,
creating goodwill among institutional investors has become an increasingly important
part of management’s job. 136 And passive funds make especially good targets for
these efforts because the benefits of supporting an activist are almost non-existent.
Finally, passive funds might decline to support an activist for fear that doing so
would harm other investments. As Elhauge and others have argued, institutional
investors with large ownership positions in competitor firms could push
management to compete less vigorously so as to maintain high profits. 137 One might
suppose that doing so would encourage activist hedge funds to target the colluding
companies and agitate for a more aggressive business strategy or for a change in
management. But passive institutional investors, which are most likely to have
horizontal investments across competing firms, would have no interest in seeing the
activist investor succeed because the increased competition would harm their other
investments. In such a case, the passive funds could simply refuse to support the
intervention under the theory that it was short-sighted.
For these reasons, if approached by an activist, a passive fund would likely
choose to do nothing. 138 If the fund does support a hedge fund activist, it will likely
do so for idiosyncratic, and perhaps even political reasons.
17 C.F.R. Parts 239, 249, 270, and 274, Release Nos. 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922.
Several empirical studies have found evidence that business relationships influence the voting
decisions of investment managers. See Dragana Cvijanović et al., Ties that Bind: How Business Connections
Affect Mutual Fund Activism. The Journal of Finance (2014) (finding that mutual fund families with
business ties to a corporation are more likely to cast pro-management votes in closely contested
situations at the corporation); Rasha Ashraf et al., Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund
Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 47 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS
567 (2009) (finding that mutual fund families with greater business ties to corporations tend to vote
more favorably to corporate managers on executive compensation matters at all corporations).
135 Wall Street firms are developing teams that focus solely on advising management on how to
strengthen corporate relationships with large institutional investors as a defense to activism. See Sonali
Basak & Beth Jinks, It’s Getting Harder to Keep the Barbarians at the Gate—and It’s This Guy’s Job,
BLOOMBERG MARKETS (Feb. 1, 2017); see also PwC’s 2016 Annual Corporate Directors Survey, The
Swinging Pendulum: Board Governance in the Age of Shareholder Empowerment (Oct. 2016),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-governance/annual-corporate-directors-survey/top-10findings.html; The Effect of Shareholder Activism on Corporate Strategy, NYSE Report (2016), available at:
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/Shareholder_Engagement_Survey_Report_2016.pdf.
136 Id.
137 See Elhauge, supra note 85; Posner et al., supra note 7.
138 On average, the Big Three are less likely to support dissident board nominees than institutions with
a greater share of assets in active funds. In 2015, Vanguard supported dissident nominees 16% of the
time; BlackRock, 36%; and State Street, 28%. By contrast, Fidelity supported dissident nominees half
of the time; T. Rowe Price, 63%. See Steve Wolosky & Aneliya Crawford, Shareholder Activism: Investing
in
a
Stronger
Corporate
America
(July
29,
2015),
available
at:
http://www.olshanlaw.com/assets/htmldocuments/Shareholder%20Activism%20%20Investing%20in%20a%20fStronger%20Corporate%20America.PDF.
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The problem, of course, is that passive funds are increasingly likely to determine
the outcome of activist campaigns. And a world in which the success of activist
interventions hinges on passive funds should be unwelcome to observers on both
sides of the investor activism debate. Those who believe that activist interventions
are harmful for companies and their long-term shareholders should be concerned
that passive funds will support activist campaigns for reasons unrelated to their
merits. By contrast, those who believe that hedge fund activists play an important
role in disciplining management should fear that passive funds will often choose to
vote with management or do nothing rather than take a chance on an intervention
proposed by an activist.
The problem is not only that passive funds are more likely to be unwilling to
serve as a keel to hedge fund activism. It is also concerning that hedge fund activists
may tailor their interventions to satisfy the least informed investors.
There is some evidence that the rise of passive investing is already affecting the
types of campaigns waged by hedge fund activists. A research team from Wharton
has conducted the only empirical research on this topic. In two studies, they were
able to isolate the effects of passive fund ownership by comparing companies near
the cutoff point for being included in the Russell 1000 and the Russell 2000
indices. 139 The first study found that greater ownership by passive mutual funds is
associated with less hedge fund activism and a greater incidence of votes against
activist shareholder proposals. 140 This was so despite the fact that a higher percentage
of passive fund ownership is correlated with the removal of takeover defenses. 141
In a second study, which examined this question using a more recent dataset, the
authors again found that companies with greater passive fund ownership were
slightly less likely to be targets of activist campaigns than firms with less passive
ownership (although the result was not statistically significant). 142 But they
discovered a bigger change in the types of campaigns utilized by activists at
companies with a higher concentration of passive funds: the study reported an
increase in campaigns seeking board representation and a corresponding decrease in
campaigns seeking policy changes such as increased dividends. 143 The study also

Appel et al., Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 49; Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive
Owners, supra note 49. Index funds are generally market-cap weighted, so the larger the market
capitalization of the company, the larger its representation in the index. As a result, companies at the
bottom of the Russell 1000 have little passive-fund ownership, while those at the top of the Russell
2000 have much more. And because those two groups of firms are of similar size and represent a
cross section of industries, the methodology isolates the changes that arise from an increase in passive
ownership.
140 Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, supra note 49.
141 Id.
142 Appel et al., Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 49.
143 Id.
139
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found that a higher level of passive fund ownership correlated with a higher number
of proxy fights, as well as settlements culminating in a board seat for the activist. 144
Of course, this is only the first study to consider this question, and it is still too
early to say how exactly the rise of passive investing will affect hedge fund activism.
But these results support the theory that passive investing will alter activist
campaigns, and not necessarily for the better. The researchers interpreted the results
as indicating that activist investors are more likely to utilize aggressive tactics and be
successful in appointing new directors to the board when passive ownership
increases. If true, it is concerning in light of the incentive problems facing passive
funds, as well as anecdotal evidence indicating that passive institutions do not spend
much time evaluating activist campaigns. It is also somewhat surprising because
passive funds are less likely to support dissident directors in proxy fights. 145
One theory that could explain these results is that activist hedge funds are aware
that balance-sheet campaigns are likely to be viewed skeptically by passive funds.
And so, the better strategy for hedge funds is to pick targets that would benefit from
a board shakeup, a more intrusive and expensive endeavor, but one that may be
consistent with the institution’s voting guidelines and therefore more likely to gain
the support of the passive funds. Another theory is that the threat of an expensive
proxy contest will more likely to induce management to settle with an activist when
management has trouble engaging with and taking the temperature of the company’s
largest shareholders.
In sum, there is reason to believe that the rise of passive investing will undermine
the beneficial complementarity between institutional investors and activist hedge
funds, although more study is necessary to determine how exactly these shareholder
dynamics will play out.
IV.

POLICY PROPOSALS

The flow of assets out of the hands of informed investors and into passive funds
is likely to have adverse consequences for the market for corporate influence,
shareholders, and the economy. Although precise quantification of this harm is
beyond the scope of this paper, there is evidence to suggest that it would be
Id. 2016 saw a pronounced reduction in activist interventions at large public companies—the same
companies that have the largest concentration of passive fund ownership. Andrew Birstingi, FactSet’s
2016
Shareholder
Activism
Review
(Feb.
1,
2017),
available
at:
https://insight.factset.com/hubfs/Resources/Research%20Desk/Market%20Insight/FactSet%27s%
202016%20Year-End%20Activism%20Review_2.1.17.pdf (noting that 2015 saw 32 campaigns against
U.S. companies with market values greater than $10 billion, compared with 17 of such campaigns in
2016). By contrast, smaller companies with market capitalization less than $1 billion actually saw a
dramatic rise in activist interventions. Id. This data may indicate that hedge funds are returning to their
traditional approach of focusing on smaller companies in light of the high cost of assembling a stake
in larger companies. See Coffee and Palia, supra note 45, at 554. It may also indicate that hedge funds
are learning that their campaigns are more uncertain when companies have a high concentration of
passive investors.
145 See Wolosky & Crawford, supra note 138.
144
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substantial. A recent study finds that ownership by “distracted” institutional
investors is correlated with a material reduction in stock price. 146 Specifically,
companies with institutional investors who experience exogenous shocks to
unrelated parts of their portfolio (and were therefore distracted) were more likely to
announce diversifying, value-destroying acquisitions with stock prices 33% lower
than the average announcement return, and 9.5% lower 36 months after deal
completion. 147 Those companies were also more likely to grant opportunisticallytimed CEO stock options, cut dividends, and less likely to fire the CEO for poor
performance. The companies that did not experience a takeover underperformed
their industry peers by an average of 15 basis points per month. 148
Research quantifying benefits from takeover activity also suggests that reduced
constraints on management lead to large social welfare losses. Michael Jensen
estimates that four-and-a-half years of takeover activity in the 1980s generated $40
billion in shareholder returns, excluding gains generated by actions undertaken
proactively in an attempt to ward off takeover attempts. 149 Since then, the market for
corporate influence has eclipsed the market for corporate control as the primary
mechanism for constraining management, suggesting that the weakening of an
important force for managerial discipline will result in shareholder losses of a similar
magnitude. 150
Of course, passive funds are unlikely to give management complete freedom—
some may choose to voice displeasure at the ballot box. But as mentioned, this could
result in the implementation of uniform governance structures across widely
divergent firms, which is also likely to harm shareholders. As just one example, a
recent study found that the average risk-adjusted return for companies that followed
proxy advisor recommendations when adjusting compensation was 0.44% lower
than firms whose changes to compensation were unrelated to proxy advisor
recommendations. 151
Therefore, there is reason to fear that the rise of passive investing will result in
substantial economic harm. 152 And thus, lawmakers face a daunting question: what to
Elisabeth Kempf, Alberto Manconi, & Oliver G. Spalt, Distracted Shareholders and Corporate Actions,
__REV. FIN. STUDIES__ (forthcoming 2017).
147 Id. at 3, 22.
148 Id. at 31.
149 Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 1, 4
(1986).
150 See, e.g., Robert Thompson, The Limits of Hedge Fund Activism, Working Paper (Oct. 6, 2006)
(describing how takeover activity receded in the face of the growing availability of defensive tactics in
the late ‘80s and attention shifted to institutional investors to confront the problems created by the
separation of ownership and control).
151 Larcker et al., supra note 120.
152 Recent scholarship has observed a link between short-termism and ownership by “quasi-indexers,”
or funds that adhere to a passive, buy-and-hold strategy of investing in a diversified set of firms.
Specifically, firms in concentrated industries with a high degree of quasi-indexer ownership invest far
less than their peers, in spite of high profitability and valuation. See German Gutierrez & Thomas
Philippon, Investment-less Growth: An Empirical Investigation, NBER Working Paper (Dec. 2016),
146
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do when the market for corporate influence loses a critical mass of active
participants, and when the loudest voices are the least informed?
Government intervention is necessary because the market distortion is the result
of an acute collective action problem, a classic market failure justifying regulation. In
addition, investors who care about governance have incomplete information:
although investors are entitled to know about a fund’s voting history, this
information does not reveal much about the quality of the voting or the fund’s other
governance efforts. Moreover, passive funds have an incentive to exacerbate this
information asymmetry between funds and investors because advertising that the
fund plays an active role in governance will help the fund attract investor assets.
There is of course the possibility that the market would self-correct in time.
When harms from passive investing materialize, they will be felt most severely by
passive fund investors. At that point, actively managed funds, which will have moved
into different segments of the market, will begin to attract investors because of their
higher relative performance.
But it would take time for investors to sufficiently correct market distortions;
investors do not change behavior immediately, and instead wait until years of poor
performance materialize into a visible long-term trend. If this sounds implausible,
recall that academics have recommended passive investment vehicles for forty years
and only in the past ten years have investors begun to favor them. 153 Without
regulatory action, therefore, it is possible that millions of investors would experience
social welfare losses for many years.
For these reasons, lawmakers would be wise to consider taking action to reduce
the influence of passive funds in governance. Such action would be preferable to
prohibiting or discouraging investors from investing in low-fee and diversified
investment vehicles. From an investor’s perspective, passive funds are generally
superior to active funds, and recent regulatory reforms have adopted this point of

http://papers.nber.org/tmp/85446-w22897.pdf. A team from the McKinsey Global Institute has
attempted to quantify the costs of a short-term mindset, observing that companies with a long-term
focus (measured by the level of investment, as well as earnings quality and growth) have consistently
outperformed their industry peers since 2001: average revenue and earnings growth were 47% and
36% higher for the firms with a long-term mindset. In addition, this study observed that firms with a
long-term focus generated substantial social welfare gains: they added approximately 12,000 more jobs
on average than their peers from 2001 to 2015. The authors calculate that U.S. GDP would have
grown by an additional $1 trillion (and the economy would have generated more than 5 million
additional jobs) if all companies had performed as well as those with a long-term perspective. The
study also posits that the U.S. economy will give up another $3 trillion in GDP and job growth by
2025 if companies continue to focus on short-term performance. See Dominic Barton, James Manyika,
Timothy Koller, Robert Palter, Jonathan Godsall, & Joshua Zoffer, Measuring the Economic Impact of
Short-Termism,
McKinsey
Global
Institute
Discussion
Paper
(Feb.
2017),
http://www.fcltglobal.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/20170206_mgishorttermism_vfinal_public.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
153 See, e.g., Langbein & Posner, supra note 57.
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view. 154 But future reforms should not ignore the benefits that active investors
provide for shareholders and the economy more broadly.
Instead, regulators could consider restricting truly passive funds from
participating in governance, and specifically, voting in shareholder elections. The
next section proposes several policy recommendations that would diminish the
influence of passive funds in corporate governance. It then demonstrates why these
restrictions are superior to proposals that would encourage institutional investors to
be thoughtful participants in governance.
A. Rethinking Passive Fund Voting
The primary governance problem created by the rise of passive investing is that
passive funds wield sizeable influence in governance, and yet they have little
incentive to use their influence to maximize firm value. In light of the fact that any
investment in voting will likely generate higher costs than benefits for the fund, it is
surprising that passive funds vote at all.
The answer is that most investment fund managers believe, wrongly, that they
are required to cast proxy votes under SEC regulations. The origin of this
misperception is relatively recent. Mutual and pension funds have been highly
regulated since the enactment of the Investment Company Act of 1940, but for
years, federal and state regulation was largely indifferent to their voting and
governance activities. 155 By the 1970s, however, as the growth of institutional
ownership portended a new governance dynamic, the SEC began to take the position
informally that investment funds had a fiduciary duty to vote their shares in
accordance with the best interests of their beneficiaries. 156
On January 23, 2003, the SEC solidified this position by adopting a rule
mandating that investment fund advisors disclose their votes, as well as their policies
and procedures for voting, in corporate elections. In the adopting release to the rule,
the SEC explained, “the investment adviser to a mutual fund is a fiduciary that owes
the fund a duty of … good faith …. This fiduciary duty extends to … the voting of

See, e.g., Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946, 20946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509–2510, and
2550).
155 See Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1419, 1461-62 (2002).
156 Id. (quoting an SEC Staff Report of Corporate Accountability which explained, “The fiduciary
principle applies to all aspects of investment management, including voting. In exercising the stock
franchise, the fiduciary has a duty to vote in such a way as to promote the interests of the
beneficiaries.”); Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, to Helmuth
Fandl, Chairman of Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc., Dep’t of Labor Interpretive Letter on Avon
Products, Inc. Employees’ Retirement Plan, 1988 WL 897696, at *2 (Feb. 23, 1988) (“In general, the
fiduciary act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate stock would include the voting of
proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.”).
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proxies relating to the fund’s portfolio securities.” 157 This rule was widely interpreted
as mandating that mutual funds vote all of the shares of their portfolio companies.
As a result, large asset managers, including the Big Three, generally do so.
But the law has never required investment advisers to vote all portfolio shares on
all matters. Recently, the DOL categorically rejected that position in an interpretation
of the application of ERISA fiduciary standards to the exercise of the shareholder
franchise:
The fiduciary duties described at ERISA Sec. 404(a)(1)(A) and (B),
require that, in voting proxies … the responsible fiduciary shall
consider only those factors that relate to the economic value of a
plan’s investment and shall not subordinate the participants and
beneficiaries to unrelated objectives…. If the responsible fiduciary
reasonably determines that the cost of voting (including the cost of research, if
necessary, to determine how to vote) is likely to exceed the expected economic
benefits of voting, or if the exercise of voting results in the imposition of … other
restrictions, the fiduciary has an obligation to refrain from voting. 158
The SEC has taken a similar view, explaining: “We do not suggest than an adviser
that fails to vote every proxy would necessarily violate its fiduciary obligations. There
may even be times when refraining from voting a proxy is in the client’s best interest, such as when
the adviser determines that the cost of voting the proxy exceeds the expected benefit
to the client.” 159
In sum, rather than being required to vote all shares on all matters, an
institutional investor is required to balance the cost of casting a vote on a particular
matter—which includes the cost of analysis and casting the vote, as well as the risk
the vote would reduce shareholder value—against the potential economic benefit to
be gained by voting. If the investor concludes that the costs of voting exceeds the
benefits, the duty is to not vote. 160 Under this framework (and in light of the lack of
consensus about governance best practices that would justify a one-size-fits-all
17 C.F.R. Parts 239, 249, 270, and 274, Release Nos. 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922; Disclosure of
Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies (Jan. 31. 2003),
available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm.
158 See Department of Labor interpretation of the legal standards imposed by Sections 402, 403 and
404 of Title I of ERISA, codified in 29 C.F.R. Part 2509.08-2, Section 1 (emphasis added). The release
went on to explain: “The fiduciary obligations of prudence and loyalty to plan participants and
beneficiaries require the responsible fiduciary to vote proxies on issues that may affect the economic
value of the plan’s investments. However, fiduciaries also need to take into account costs when
deciding whether and how to exercise their shareholder rights, including the voting of shares. Such
costs include, but are not limited to, expenditures related to developing proxy resolutions, proxy
voting services and the analysis of the net effect of a particular issue on the economic value of the
plan’s investment. Fiduciaries must take all of these factors into account in determining whether…the
voting of a proxy…is expected to have an effect on the economic value of the plan’s investment that
will outweigh the cost of exercising such rights.” Id.
159 Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2106, “Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers,” (Jan. 31,
2003) (emphasis added).
160 See Nathan, The Parallel Universes, supra note 104.
157
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voting approach), it is likely that a passive fund manager who votes under all
circumstances would breach its fiduciary duty to investors, unless that fund manager
is relying on information from an active fund manager housed within the same
institution.
Perhaps all that is needed is for the SEC to emphasize once again that passive
fund managers breach their fiduciary duties to investors when their voting creates
costs in excess of the benefits. If passive funds knew that they could be subject to
liability for uninformed voting, perhaps some would abstain more often.
But it is likely that something more is needed to deter passive funds from voting.
This is because the institution may benefit from casting votes in shareholder
elections, even when voting is not in investors’ best interests. There are two
motivations that may compel institutions to vote regularly. First, if the institution is
perceived as being an involved and engaged steward, that will help funds attract
assets and clients, especially from pension funds (a large and growing passive fund
client) or other groups that view governance as a priority. 161 The fact that the Big
Three increasingly tout their governance expertise in their marketing materials, in
speeches, 162 and in op-eds 163 indicates that they believe that creating an appearance of
governance expertise will help them win clients.
Moreover, there is a first-mover disadvantage to abstaining from voting—the
market could view the decision to not vote as a signal of poor quality, especially
when all other funds continue to highlight their governance abilities. In other words,
unless all passive funds collectively gave up their voting rights, it is unlikely that any
one institution would voluntarily choose to do so.
Second, and more cynically, an institution may view the role of key
decisionmaker as a powerful tool that can help it win points with another set of
actual or potential clients: the companies that they invest in. If management is a key

CalPERS, the largest U.S. pension fund (with $300 billion in assets under management) states
clearly in its Investment Policy that “CalPERS expects all … external managers of CalPERS capital to
integrate the CalPERS Principles into investment decision making, including proxy voting….”
CalPERS Total Fund Investment Policy, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/total-fund-investmentpolicy.pdf.
162 See, e.g., F. William McNabb III, Getting to Know You: The Case for Significant Shareholder Engagement,
Harvard Forum for Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (June 24, 2015), available at:
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/getting-to-know-you-the-case-for-significantshareholder-engagement/ (“[W]e are permanent shareholders. To borrow a phrase from Warren
Buffet: Our favorite holding period is forever. We’re going to hold your stock when you hit your
quarterly earnings target. And we’ll hold it when you don’t. We’re going to hold your stock if we like
you. And if we don’t. We’re going to hold your stock when everyone else is piling in. And when
everyone else is running for the exits….That is precisely why we care so much about good
governance.”).
163 F. William McNabb III, Proxy Votes Certainly Matter to Index Funds, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2017),
available
at:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/proxy-votes-certainly-matter-to-index-funds1499289400?tesla=y; Vanguard, The Ultimate Long Term Investors, Seeking Alpha (Aug. 2, 2017), available
at: https://seekingalpha.com/article/4089524-ultimate-long-term-investors.
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client of the institution, either for 401(k) assets or other services, that institution will
have a strong motivation to cast management-friendly votes.
The Big Three are therefore unlikely to voluntarily abstain from voting without
legal intervention. The sections that follow propose several rules that would restrict
passive funds from voting in shareholder elections. 164
i.

Eliminate Passive Fund Voting

The simplest proposal would restrict passive funds from voting their shares. 165 In
other words, the law would treat a passive fund manager like a derivative holder
when it comes to voting.
There is a compelling legal rationale for such a law: a passive fund attracts
investors on the basis of its ability to track an index. As such, active and informed
voting will increase costs for investors without corresponding benefits and therefore
would arguably breach the fund’s fiduciary duty under ERISA. Likewise, a
thoughtless, automated approach to voting would also be likely to harm investors. As
such, the law would make all parties better off by restricting passive funds from
casting uninformed votes.
The rule could employ a presumption that any fund that uses indexing as an
investment strategy is a passive fund. That presumption could be rebutted, allowing
the passive fund to be “certified” for voting, if the fund showed that its strategy
incorporated meaningful portfolio company research—including ongoing
monitoring and fundamental analysis—and that its investment in governance is
above a certain threshold (based on the fund’s size). A passive fund could also be
certified to vote shares of certain companies if it demonstrated that it had access to
information generated by actively managed funds housed in the same institution. 166
To qualify, the passive fund would need to show that the actively managed fund had
a meaningful investment in the shared portfolio company and that the active fund
otherwise met the requirements for voting certification (i.e., that it met the
monitoring, analysis, and investment threshold). Finally, a passive fund could retain
its votes if it committed itself to “mirror voting” under all circumstances, which
Ronald Gilson and Curtis Milhaupt have made a similar proposal to limit the voting ability of
sovereign wealth funds who acquire significant stakes in domestic companies. See Sovereign Wealth
Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Merchantilism, Stanford Law and
Economics Olin Working Paper No. 355 (February 18, 2008).
165 To ease the burden of implementation, the rule would specify that restricted shares would not be
counted in the denominator for quorum or director election purposes. In addition, the rule would not
encumber the stock and thus devalue it—voting stock would continue to provide the holder with the
right to vote, but the passive institution would be restricted from exercising that right. Finally, the rule
could incorporate narrow exceptions to reduce the risk of abuse, such as allowing voting rights for
corporate actions that would harm passive investors’ economic interests.
166 Many passive funds would likely meet this exception in light of the fact that they are often housed
within the same institution as actively managed funds. But if the level of overlap declines with the rise
of passive investing, the rule would greatly reduce the uninformed voting power of passively managed
funds. Moreover, the exception might have the beneficial effect of encouraging institutions to
maintain actively managed funds whose investments overlap with passive funds.
164
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would require the passive fund to vote its shares in the same way as the other
shareholders.
This rule would be relatively costless to implement because it would simply
relieve passive funds of obligations rather than impose new ones. In addition, passive
fund managers would be unlikely to oppose a rule that freed them from onerous
governance obligations that have few benefits for their investors. 167
Moreover, a passive fund that wished to retain its voting power could do so by
increasing its investment in governance. For this reason, the rule would encourage
beneficial fund differentiation and make the market for funds more transparent:
investors who cared about governance could choose a certified fund and pay a
higher fee to support its governance efforts. Other investors who wanted nothing
more than stable returns could invest in truly passive funds, without fear of paying
for costly and potentially harmful voting efforts.
Of course, the primary benefit of this rule would be to diminish the voice of
uninformed investors in governance, reducing the risk of market distortion. But by
diminishing the voice of passive funds, the rule would also preserve the influence of
informed investors by giving each active investor a proportional increase in voting
power. 168 Although voting is only a part of the institutional investor’s toolkit, the
added voting power would improve active fund’s efficacy in backroom
conversations. It would also enable investors that are motivated to secure the longterm health of the company to determine the success of hedge fund activist
campaigns.
ii.

Institute Pass-Through Voting for Passive Funds

The second proposal would not eliminate passive voting entirely, but would
instead specify that voting power for “non-routine” matters would flow through to
the passive fund’s investors in a phenomenon known as “pass-through voting.” 169
167 The fact that the Big Three have vocally opposed the rising incidence of dual class structures casts
some doubt on this claim. They have also participated in lobbying efforts to ban dual class companies
from stock exchanges and stock indices, arguing that they are forced to buy nonvoting and low-voting
shares because of their indexing strategy, even when they oppose it. See Alexandra Scaggs, Investor
Group to Exchanges: Stop Dual Class Listings, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2012), available at:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443749204578050431073959840.
But this opposition has come from the leaders of the Big Three, and is consistent with the theory that
it is motivated by the institution’s desire to retain influence, rather than an optimal strategy for the
institution’s passive funds.
168 Corporate insiders would also benefit from an increase in voting power, potentially worsening
agency cost problems. But except for the few shareholder proposals that passive funds embrace, the
Big Three generally cast votes in favor of management. Therefore, omitting the passive fund vote
would more likely decrease management’s influence over governance in most cases.
169 See, e.g., Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 47–52 (1991) (proposing pass-through voting to allow pension fund beneficiaries
to determine fund voting policies); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund
Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 843, 888–89 (2009) (mentioning
optional pass-through voting as a potential option to allow mutual fund shareholders to overcome the
passivity of their intermediaries).
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This would mean that two groups of investors would control the funds’ votes:
institutions, such as pension funds like CalPERs, 170 as well as retail shareholders. The
former group of investors are likely to be relatively sophisticated, engaged, and
capable of exercising their vote in an informed manner, especially if they also own
shares in the company through other active investments. The latter group of
investors would be unlikely to vote because of collective action problems, providing
a benefit similar to that of the first proposal—reducing the incidence of uninformed
voting. 171
There is some precedent in the law for pass-through voting: other investment
vehicles, such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans, are required to pass through
votes to plan participants. 172 In addition, mutual funds already have a voting
mechanism in place for their own governance, and so the rule could simply require
mutual funds to circulate proxy materials for portfolio companies using the same
process.
However, because passively managed funds involve pooled investments, the
burden of passing voting authority for hundreds of companies to investors would
not only be overwhelming for the fund, but also for investors. Restricting the rule to
“non-routine” matters would help reduce this burden. The New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”) provides a blueprint for such a distinction: under NYSE rules,
brokers cannot cast discretionary votes for shareholders on non-routine matters,
which are defined to include director elections, proposals to declassify the board of
directors, proposals to eliminate supermajority voting requirements, and proposals
enacting certain types of anti-takeover provision overrides. 173 Similarly, a passthrough voting rule could mandate that votes for non-routine matters would pass
through to investors.
This version of the rule would have another benefit. Because the passive fund
would also be likely to pass implementation costs on to investors, this rule would
make passively managed funds slightly more expensive, and thus, slightly less
appealing relative to actively managed funds. In this way, the rule could somewhat
ameliorate the free rider problem and staunch the flow of assets from active to
passive funds.

See Ananth N. Madhavan, EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS AND THE NEW DYNAMICS OF INVESTING
16 (Oxford U. P. 2016) (noting that 65% of ETF ownership is institutional).
171 Luis A. Aguilar, Ensuring the Proxy Process Works for Shareholders, SEC Public Statement (Feb. 19,
2015), available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/021915-psclaa.html (noting that retail
shareholder participation in the proxy process has been falling steadily since 2009, with less than a
13% response rate for the period from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014).
172 See 26 U.S.C.S. § 409(e)(2).
173 See NYSE Rule 452; NYSE Information Memo 12-4, Application of Rule 452 to Certain Types of
Corporate
Governance
Proxy
Proposals,
available
at:
http://www.nyse.com/nysenotices/nyse/information-memos/detail;jsessionid=0610BF54CEE27E
E065651385975C6C1B?memo_id=12-4.
170
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iii.

Institute Pass-Through Voting as a Default

Finally, a rule could provide for pass-through voting on non-routine matters as a
default, allowing investors the option of reassigning the proxy back to the fund. 174
The primary benefit of this version of the rule is that it would foster competition and
differentiation in governance activity across passive funds. Certain passive funds
might invest in monitoring and analysis so as to market themselves as governance
experts and attract not just investors, but their votes. Moreover, institutions that
house both passive and active funds will be more likely to recognize the value of
active fund stewardship if it helps the institution secure greater voting power.
A passive fund could also attract investors and votes by developing governance
expertise in a certain area. And although passive funds that invest in governance
would likely charge higher fees than truly passive funds, investors who care about
good governance would be more likely to tolerate them. If this seems implausible,
consider the modest success of social responsibility funds, which attract investors by
selecting portfolio companies based on certain criteria, such as a commitment to
environmentally friendly practices. 175
For investors who want nothing more than low-cost diversification, there would
be the option to invest in passive funds that also take a passive approach to
governance. The investor who chooses such a fund would likely hold on to her
vote—default rules tend to be sticky 176—and abstain from voting. In other words,
this rule would ensure the votes that are the least likely to be the product of
informed thinking are also the least likely to be cast.
*

*

*

Any of these simple and low-cost rules would diminish the uninformed voting
power of passive funds in governance and thus preserve the voice and influence of
active and informed investors. But there are other benefits. By restricting the
governance activities of passive funds, these proposed rules would increase the
visibility of benefits provided by active funds. In this way, these rules would improve
market transparency, enabling investors to distinguish between funds with
governance expertise and those that offer nothing more than the opportunity to
make low-cost and stable market returns. They would also make it easier for active

174 The rule would be drafted in such a way as to avoid the possibility that funds would evade it by
adding a standard clause to every share purchase agreement that reassigned voting authority back to
the fund managers. As an example, the rule could require the active assignment of voting rights by
investors.
175 Does Socially Responsible Investing Make Financial Sense?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/does-socially-responsible-investing-make-financial-sense-1456715888
(discussing the rising popularity of socially responsible investing).
176 See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4-5 (2006) (describing the “iron law of default
inertia”).
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funds to attract investors who care about governance and make it harder for passive
funds to free ride on their investments in stewardship. 177
At first glance, these rules appear to be an extreme departure from our system of
shareholder democracy. Traditionally, shares of common stock include economic
rights, as well as a right to vote that is proportional to share ownership. But
shareholder democracy is not a political democracy where every person has a
constitutional right to vote. Instead, voting rights are generally allocated on a per
share basis—in other words, voting power grows with an individual’s stake in the
company. And for over a century, permissive corporate codes have allowed
companies to depart from the one-share-one-vote default and even deprive classes of
stock of voting rights. 178
Nor does the right to vote in a shareholder election further participatory or civic
interests. It originated as a protection for the residual claimants and has been
justified as efficient because it allocates voting control to those who have the best
incentives to use their vote to maximize the firm’s value. 179 In other words, voting is
instrumental to corporate welfare only, and there is therefore a principled basis for

177 Restricting the voting power of uninformed and unmotivated shareholders has another important
benefit. Delaware courts have increasingly awarded special deference to corporate decisions that are
ratified by a majority of disinterested shareholders. For example, in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that transactions subject to enhanced scrutiny under Revlon will be
reviewed under the business judgment rule if such shareholder approval is granted. 125 A.3d 304
(Del. 2015). This decision was justified, in part, by the fact that public companies are held by
sophisticated institutional investors with “an actual economic stake in the outcome.” Id. But, for the
reasons discussed, passive funds lack the incentives to vote intelligently, undermining the rationale
that courts should defer to decisions blessed by their votes.
178 State law today generally provides corporations with considerable flexibility with respect to
allocations of voting rights: virtually all state corporate codes adopt one vote per common share as the
default rule but allow corporations to depart from the norm. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Scope of the
SEC’s Authority Over Shareholder Voting Rights, UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 07-16,
available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=985707; Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8
§ 151 (authorizing a corporation to have different classes of stock with such rights, powers, and
preferences as may be set forth in the certificate of incorporation or the board, if the certificate gives
the board that power). Many corporations depart from the one-share-one-vote rule by adopting dual
class capital structures that are routinely upheld by courts.
In fact, limitations on shareholder voting rights are as old as the corporate form itself. In the
mid-1800s, before the adoption of general incorporation statutes, corporate charters granted by
legislatures employed varying voting structures. Some embraced a one-share-one-vote rule, while
others limited the voting rights of large shareholders, such as by capping the number of votes any one
shareholder could cast. Id. at 4. By the 1900s, the vast majority of U.S. corporations had established
one vote per share as a default rule, leaving corporations free to deviate from the statutory standard.
Id. at 5. During this time, the current norm of limiting the voting rights of preferred stock became
common. Id. In addition, companies began to issue non-voting common stock—in the years between
1927 and 1932, at least 288 corporations issued non-voting or limited voting rights shares (which was
almost half of the total number of such issuances). Id. at 7.
179 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 63, 67 (1991).
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depriving uninformed shareholders of the right to vote if doing so would improve
firm efficiency. 180
But how could one of these proposals be enacted into law? The SEC is an
obvious candidate because regulation of the proxy process is a core function of the
agency. However, the SEC’s only effort to regulate substantive voting rights was
struck down by the D.C. Circuit in 1988. 181 During the 1980s, as companies began to
recognize the power of dual class stock schemes to defend against hostile takeover
bids, the SEC responded by adopting Rule 19c-4, which effectively prohibited public
companies from issuing securities or taking other corporate action nullifying,
restricting, or disparately reducing the voting rights of existing shareholders. 182 It did
this by adding a new rule to the listing standard of each national securities exchange
and securities association. 183
The SEC had argued that it had the authority to adopt the rule based on
Securities Exchange Act § 19(c), which permits it to amend exchange rules provided
that the action furthers the Act’s purposes. The agency contended that § 14(a) of the
Act embodied the purpose of protecting shareholder democracy. The D.C. Circuit
disagreed, ruling that § 14(a) did not give the SEC power to regulate substantive
aspects of shareholder voting, but only to regulate the procedures by which proxy
solicitations are conducted, as well as proxy voting disclosure. 184
The Supreme Court did not review that decision, but the Court had previously
made clear that it views the substance of corporate voting rights as solely being a
matter of state concern. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., the Court explained, “No
principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s
authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the
voting rights of shareholders.” 185 Accordingly, without a clear expression of
congressional intent, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would uphold a federal
agency’s enactment of a law governing the substance of shareholder voting rights.
But the Securities Exchange Act’s preference for shareholder democracy is
intended to protect against the “control of great corporations by a very few
persons.” 186 When the equal allocation of corporate voting rights has the potential to
180 Others have made similar arguments in the context of judicial elections, where the large majority of
voters are uninformed and incentivizing them to master technical issues of governance arguably
results in an inefficient division of labor. See Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a Political
Environment, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2006); Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102
Kentucky L. J. 553 (2013); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 52
(2003).
181 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
182 Bainbridge, SEC Authority, supra note 178, at 8.
183 Id. at 9 n.25.
184 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 at 408.
185 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987); see also Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977) (clarifying that
internal corporate affairs are for the states to govern).
186 SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948)
(discussing the reasons behind the enactment of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act).
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empower a small number of institutions and risk market distortions and wide-scale
economic harm, it may be appropriate for the federal government to step in. And
federal intervention is likely the only option: corporations would be unlikely to
voluntarily amend their certificates of incorporation to restrict the majority of their
shareholders from voting, and states could not be counted on to require such a
restriction that might cause large institutional investors to flee to other states.
B. The Difficulty of Incentivizing Beneficial Investment in Governance
Thus far, in considering how to address the agency cost problem, regulators and
scholars have proposed reforms aimed at incentivizing large institutional investors to
be responsible stewards of their investments. For example, the SEC justified rules
imposing proxy voting disclosure obligations on mutual funds on the ground that
such rules would “encourage funds to become more engaged in corporate
governance of issuers held in their portfolios.” 187 These rules have not had this
intended effect—instead, it appears that disclosure obligations have merely increased
pressure on mutual funds to vote all shares, an enormous task that makes it difficult,
if not impossible, to cast an informed vote in all cases. 188 The rules also failed to
address the collective action problem that discourages mutual funds from investing
in governance. Thus, any future reform aimed at encouraging institutional investor
engagement would need to tackle this incentive problem head on.
One possible reform could be modeled after the derivative suit, the traditional
corporate tool used to combat agency problems within a corporation. The derivative
suit was intended to reduce conflicts between managers and shareholders by allowing
shareholders to pursue claims on the behalf of the corporation. 189 The classic case is
an action for a breach of fiduciary duty against corporate directors: the directors
cannot be expected to cause the corporation to sue themselves, and so the derivative
action allows the shareholders to take over the litigation and prosecute on behalf of
the corporation. If the suit confers benefits to the corporation and its shareholders,
the shareholder plaintiff can recover attorneys’ fees and expenses from the
corporation, 190 which reduces the problem of other shareholders free riding off of
the efforts of the shareholder plaintiff. 191
Like the shareholder who brings a beneficial derivative suit, a fund that invests in
governance at a portfolio company secures a benefit that all shareholders desire but
Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies, Release Nos. 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922, 2003 SEC Lexis 3143 (2003).
188 See Strine, Can We Do Better?, supra note 5, at 483-90 (noting that “the present system involves too
many votes for the institutional investor community to address thoughtfully and creates a rational
basis to suspect that even proxy advisory firms cannot afford to employ enough qualified analysts to
provide a genuinely studied recommendation on every vote”).
189 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (1991).
190 Ralph C. Ferrara, Kevin T. Abikoff, & Laura Leedy Gansler, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION: BESEIGING THE BOARD SECTION 14.06, Attorneys’ Fees and Incentive Awards (2005).
191 FRANK EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL FISCHEL, HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 897 n.192
(2007).
187
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are not willing to pay for. Therefore, a rule providing expense reimbursement for
shareholders who intervene in governance and secure a benefit would make
stewardship more appealing for institutional investors.
Currently, our regulatory system does the opposite—regulators penalize actively
managed funds that invest in monitoring and governance by scrutinizing
management fees. These policies are well-intentioned, as there is ample evidence of
funds levying inappropriately high fees to take advantage of uninformed investors. 192
But scrutinizing fees is a blunt tool for policing abuse, and a rule that would allow a
governance intervenor to recoup expenses associated with a beneficial intervention
would reduce the risk of unintended consequences caused by regulatory scrutiny. It
would also improve the competitiveness of funds with governance expertise and thus
staunch the flow of assets out of those funds.
Such a rule could define a reimbursable governance intervention to be an action
that results in a policy change that substantially benefits the company. The benefit
could be demonstrated by a sustained (at least a year) boost in stock price following
the intervention. The intervenor would receive costs associated with that
intervention, limited to research costs incurred no more than one month prior to the
intervention, as well as the costs of meeting with management, voting, or waging a
proxy contest. Those costs could not exceed the benefit to the corporation.
Although this rule would incentivize governance interventions, it would do so at
a lower than optimal level. This is because a fund would only be able to recoup a
fraction of the costs, because interventions generally require sustained, firm-specific
monitoring and the development of governance expertise over many years. Relatedly,
it would be difficult to quantify the costs and the long-term benefit of the
intervention, and therefore the rule would likely generate expensive litigation.
One might suppose that awarding a portion of the benefit from the intervention,
rather than the cost, would address some of these concerns. As an example, the
SEC’s whistleblower program provides a monetary reward for “high-quality original
information that leads to [an] enforcement action in which over $1,000,000 in
sanctions is ordered.” 193 The range for the award is 10% and 30% of the money
collected. 194 If a shareholder (or group of shareholders) were able to recoup even
10% of the benefit of any governance intervention, this would greatly improve
incentives to invest in stewardship.
But there are reasons why the law generally avoids benefit-based liability: it is
very difficult to quantify the benefit, as well as determine causation. The latter
determination would be particularly challenging in this context, where an activist
investor may influence management by targeting a firm in the same industry, or

See WILLIAM BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE NOW (OUP 2016).
SEC Office of the Whistleblower, available at: https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/.
194 Id.
192
193
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making a threat to intervene. 195 In addition, the statutory definition of “benefit”
would likely influence the type of intervention that is chosen, again risking
governance distortions. Therefore, a rule incentivizing investors to be engaged
owners would likely result in more costs than benefits. 196
V.

CONCLUSION

In the past twenty years, the market for corporate influence has become an
important force for managerial discipline. Yet, the rise of passive investing has the
potential to dampen and distort this market, increasing agency costs and harming
shareholder welfare. Although the amount of assets invested in actively managed
funds is currently ameliorating the risk of distortion, the rapid influx of assets into
passive funds may soon overwhelm this temporary balance. Lawmakers, therefore,
should consider whether legal intervention is warranted.
At this time, it appears that a rule restricting passive funds from voting would
offer the most benefits and generate the fewest costs. Although voting is just one
tool used by institutional investors to influence management, the rise of passive
investing will make it even more important. Active fund analysts are the primary
drivers of meetings with management and the board; as their number decreases,
institutional investor engagement will become less frequent and less effective.
Accordingly, fewer battles will be settled in a back room conversations, as many are
now, and a greater number will be resolved in expensive proxy battles.
By restricting passive funds from voting, the law would reduce the risk of
governance distortion created by the rise of passive investing. It would also preserve

An example from civil rights law exemplifies some of the difficulties associated with determining
causation. For years, courts have struggled to interpret fee-shifting provisions in the Fair Housing
Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, which permit a court to award reasonable
attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party.” In 2001, the Supreme Court held that the predominating
approach—examining whether the plaintiff was the “catalyst” for the result—was improper. See
Buckhannon Bd. And Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598
(2001). Instead, a court could only shift fees if the plaintiff secured a judgment on the merits or in a
court-ordered consent decree. Id. In so holding, the Court emphasized the difficulty of determining
the defendant’s subjective motivation in changing its conduct—the catalyst approach was “clearly not
a formula for ‘ready administrability.’” Id. at 609. A law allowing a plaintiff to recover a portion of the
benefit from a governance intervention would create similar administrative difficulties.
196 Another possible solution would be to regulate the proxy advisors that offer advice to passive
funds. In fact, Congress is considering whether to mandate greater regulatory oversight of proxy
advisors, proposing to require them to: register with the SEC; employ an ombudsman to receive
complaints about voting information accuracy; disclose potential conflicts of interest; disclose
procedures and methodologies for formulating proxy recommendations and analyses; and essentially
provide companies with an opportunity to review and comment on a proposed recommendation by a
proxy advisory firm before the recommendation is provided to investors. See Corporate Governance
Reform and Transparency Act of 2016, H.R. 5311, 114th Cong. (2016). But this regulation would
significantly increase the costs of third party proxy advisory services without addressing the real
problem: that third party proxy advisors lack any financial incentive in the outcome of their
recommendations. And it would be difficult for Congress to craft a rule that would lessen that
problem.
195
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the voice of informed investors as a force for discipline and a safeguard against
agency problems created by the separation of ownership and control.
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